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Wall Street v. Main Street: The SEC's New
Regulation FD and Its Impact on Market
Participants
D. CASEY KOBI't
"High-quality and timely information is the lifeblood of strong, vibrant markets. It
is at the very core of investor confidence."'
INTRODUCTION
Just as Wall Street once rumbled in response to the implementation of Section 11
of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"),2 again, those same tremors are felt
in answer to the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") new Regulation
Fair Disclosure ("Regulation FD").' Although Wall Street's projection that Section
11 would destroy the market for public offerings was an overstatement, Section 11
liability has shaped the registration process. Likewise, Regulation FD4 is unlikely to
completely chill the disclosure of information by public companies; rather, it will
merely shape communications between companies and investment professionals.
On October 23, 2000, the SEC's new rules prohibiting selective disclosure took
effect.' Regulation FD was adopted to address what the SEC perceived to be the
* Associate, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, New York, New York; J.D., 2001,
Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1997, Kelley School of Business,
Indiana University-Bloomington. I would like to thank Professors J. William Hicks and
Hannah L. Buxbaum for their valuable comments and insights. Also, I would like to
acknowledge Janel B. Kobi for her critical commentary on earlier drafts of this Article.
" This Article has been prepared for informational purposes and does not constitute legal
advice on any specific matters. Publication of this Article does not create a lawyer-client
relationship and readers should not act upon this information without seeking professional
guidance.
1. Arthur Levitt, Chairman's Statement to Sec. & Exch. Comm'n on Regulation Fair
Disclosure (Aug. 10, 2000), at http:llwww.sec.gov/newslextraseldisal.htm [hereinafter Levitt].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77(1994). Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 establishes liability for
fraudulent registration statements. If a registration statement is false or misleading, purchasers
in a registered offering may recover damages from enumerated participants in the offering.
Wall Street professionals predicted that § 11 would destroy the market for public offerings. The
professionals' predictions have been proven incorrect, and § I 1 has shaped the roles of
company officials, directors, underwriters, lawyers, and accounts in the registration process.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(1994); see also Barns v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967). Likewise,
many investment professionals fear that Regulation FD will have a chilling effect on
companies' disclosure of information to the public and have a dramatic impact on securities
markets.
3. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2000).
4. Id.
5. Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715,51,716 (Aug. 24,2000)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,243, and 249). In addition to the rules regarding selective
disclosuie, the SEC adopted two rules involving insider trading, which are outside the purview
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problem of public companies selectively disclosing material nonpublic information
to Wall Street professionals at the expense of Main Street individual investors.6 The
new rules provide that when an issuer or person acting on the issuer's behalf
selectively discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons,
the issuer must make public disclosure of that same information.7 Public companies
must now respond by implementing strategies for disclosing information to Wall
Street professionals. Only time will tell what impact Regulation FD will have on Wall
Street, Main Street, and in corporate headquarters.
This Article provides an analysis of Regulation FD and its impact on
communications between companies and market participants. Part I of this Article
discusses the background leading to the adoption of Regulation FD and the concerns
surrounding selective disclosure. Part II analyzes the elements of Regulation FD. Part
IIl addresses the effects Regulation FD will have on Wall Street professionals. Part
IV focuses on Regulation FD's impact on individual investors' access to information.
Finally, Part V considers Regulation FD's effect on public companies and provides
some guidance for disclosing information.
I. BACKGROUND
Full and fair disclosure of material information by issuers to the market is the
cornerstone of the federal securities laws.' Through the mandatory disclosure system
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"),9 Congress intended to
promote the disclosure of complete and honest information to facilitate efficient
securities markets." However, federal securities laws do not generally require public
disclosure of information concerning corporate developments at the moment they
occur. "Rather, the Exchange Act requires periodic reporting of specific information
on a regular basis, and some issuers are required to report certain events soon after
they occur.'" In the absence of a specified duty to disclose, the Exchange Act does not
require an issuer to disclose all material events as soon as they occur, therefore
of this Article. See id.
6. See id. SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, and his crusade against selective disclosure
spearheaded the adoption of Regulation FD. The new regulation was passed three to one, the
dissenting vote coming from Commissioner Laura Unger. Michael Schroeder& Randall Smith,
Disclosure Rule Cleared by the SEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2000, at Cl.
7. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103.
8. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934). The concept of fair public markets is built
upon the theory that the judgments of buyers and sellers concerning the fair market price of a
security brings about a just price. Selective disclosure of material information obstructs the
operation of fair price valuation.
9. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
10. S. REP. No. 73-792, at 10-11 (1934); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999).
11. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592.
12. Id. at 72,591; see also Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments,
Securities Act Release No. 5092, 35 Fed. Reg. 16733 (Oct. 15, 1970) (examples include the
Exchange Act required filings on Forms 10-K, I0-Q, and 8-K).
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allowing issuers some control over the precise timing of important corporate
disclosures.' 3 With the adoption of Regulation FD, the SEC addresses the practical
problem of public companies making selective disclosure of material information to
small groups of Wall Street professionals before making broad disclosure to the
investing public.
Through the adoption of Regulation FD, the SEC intends to eliminate public
companies' selective disclosure of important nonpublic information to Wall Street
before making full disclosure of the same information to Main Street. When issuers
selectively disclose material information, those in possession of the information prior
to the public release are capable of making profits or avoiding losses at the expense
of the uninformed. The SEC takes the position that the practice of selective disclosure
leads to the public's loss of confidence in the integrity of capital markets. 4 When
material information travels only to a privileged few and that information is used to
profit at the expense of Main Street investors, the integrity of America's securities
markets is at risk. Main Street investors who observe drastic changes in securities
prices and only later receive the material information responsible for the changes are
not on a level playing field with Wall Street insiders.
The SEC provides three guiding reasons for the adoption of Regulation FD. 5 The
first is that selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity
and fairness of capital markets. 6 Selective disclosure resembles insider trading in that
select individuals gain an informational edge from their access to corporate insiders,
rather than from skill and diligence.' Recent high-profile reports of public
companies' selective disclosure of material information that led to significant profit
or loss avoidance for Wall Street have eroded investors' confidence in the fairness
of the securities markets." Protection of investor confidence is important and the
impact of selective disclosure is significant in today's highly volatile, earnings-
sensitive securities markets. 9
13. See Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Securities Act, 35 Fed.
Reg. at 16,733. See generally Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,593.
14. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,243, and 249).
15. Id. at 51,716-17.
16. Id. at 51,716.
17. Id. There is a significant resemblance to the "tipping" standard of insider trading
liability set forth in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-64 (1983). As presented in the proposing
release, the SEC believes that Dirks imposed undue analytical burdens in prosecuting tips to
Wall Street analysts under an insider trading theory. Enforcement under the insider trading
theoryis constrained by the requirement that the insider benefitted from disclosing information.
Regulation FD addresses the problem ofselective disclosure by establishing an issuer reporting
requirement, rather than treating it as insider trading. See Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,595.
18. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716. Chairman Arthur
Levitt raised the issue of market integrity, calling the practice of selective disclosure a "stain
on the markets." Chairman Arthur Levitt, Speech to the Economic Club of New York, N.Y.
(Oct. 18, 1999), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch304.htm.
19. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592. The practice of
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Second, the SEC is concerned with nonpublic material information being used to
curry favors with Wall Street analysts. Regulation FD was adopted to address the
potential for public companies to treat information as a commodity to be used to gain
favor with analysts or institutional investors.20 The concern is that analysts may be
pressured to produce favorable reports about a company or alter their analysis in
order to have continued access to information.2 Analysts who publish negative views
of a company's securities may run the risk of being cut-off from corporate officials
and phone conversations or meetings in which competing analysts have access.2 It
is the SEC's position that Regulation FD's prohibition on selective disclosure
promotes fair analysts' reports. Analysts are now less inclined to slant their reports
in order to protect business relationships. The SEC believes the pressure on Wall
Street analysts is reduced by Regulation FD's restriction on selectively disclosing
material information to favored analysts.'
The third reason the SEC has adopted Regulation FD is that technological
developments have made it much easier for the broad dissemination of-information;
therefore, selective disclosure is no longer necessary to maintain efficient markets.24
In the past, issuers had to rely on market analysts to serve as information
intermediaries due to technological limitations. With the recent developments in the
technology industry, selective disclosure is no longer necessary to disseminate
material information to the investing public.2" The SEC encourages the use of live
transmissions of conferences and annual meetings via closed-circuit television or
Internet webcasting, listen-in telephone conferences, and company Web sites as a
means of corporate disclosure.' Therefore, "technological limitations no longer
provide an excuse for abiding the threats to market integrity that selective disclosure
selective disclosure is reported to be widespread at small-growth companies, where companies
disclose poor performance news to Wall Street analysts to prevent a sharp reaction by the
whole market. Chairman Arthur Levitt stated, "[W]e haveplaced such apremium on short-term
results that even the most modest change in earnings provokes a dramatic market response."
Kate Berry, SEC's Levitt Discusses Issues About Analysts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1999, at Cl.
20. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716.
2 I. Id. at 51,717; see also Justin Schack, The Mounting Price of Fame, INST. INVESTOR
43 (Oct. 2000) ("Top corporate executives are pressing investment houses more than ever for
favorable research if they want to win any banking business; analysts who don't toe the line
can find themselves walking the streets.").
22. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718.
23. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,593.
24. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717.
25. Id. The SEC assumes that a more democratic market is a more efficient market. Rather
than adopting a trickle down approach of issuer-to-analysts-to-investor, Regulation FD
attempts to eliminate the informational advantage Wall Street has over Main Street. Due to the
reduction in technology costs, broad disclosure to investors on a real time basis is feasible. See
id.
26. Id. While recommending the use of technological developments for disclosing
information, the SEC does not adopt the position that the Internet, by itself, would satisfy the
public dissemination requirements of the new Regulation FD. See id.; see also infra Part II.F.
(discussing Regulation FD's public disclosure requirements).
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represents. 27
The SEC's release 8 proposing the adoption of Regulation FD ignited public
comment 29 A majority of these comments originated fromMain Street investors who
supported the adoption of Regulation FD." While Regulation FD had gained the
support of many Main Street investors, others were concerned about the new rule's
impact on the flow of information.1 Notwithstanding the SEC's noble intentions of
curtailing the selective disclosure of information, Regulation FD may have a
pervasive impact on corporate disclosure practices and significantly risks muffling
the flow of information to the markets. Wall Street professionals believe that
securities markets benefit from a constant flow of communications between issuers
and analysts 2 Due to the revolution in securities information technology, individual
investors have rapid access to these communications. However, the SEC feels that
selective disclosure is a significant problem and there is a need to prohibit the
practice in order to bolster investor confidence in the integrity of the securities
markets.
33
Some commentators (predominantly Wall Street professionals) contend that
Regulation FD is an inappropriate response to the issue of corporate disclosure.34
These commentators do acknowledge the problem of selective disclosure; however,
they suggest that existing insider trading laws be used to enforce actions that involve
abusive selective disclosure.35 The SEC believes otherwise, because the uncertainties
posed by insider trading laws afford considerable protection to insiders who
selectively disclose information to analysts .36 In attempting to provide clear guidance
27. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717.
28. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590.
29. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717. Approximately
6000 comment letters were received by the SEC in response to the release proposing the
adoption of Regulation FD. Id.
30. Id. Reasons for Main Street's support of Regulation FD include: selective disclosure
places investors at a disadvantage and is similar to traditional insider trading; investors do not
rely exclusively on Wall Street research; the "online" revolution allows investors to conduct
their own research; and investors are concerned with the concept of information gatekeepers.
Public comments can be viewed on the SEC Web site, http://www.sec.gov.
31. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718.
32. See id.
33.Id. at 51,716.
34. Id. af 51,718. See examples in comment letters of the Securities Industry Association,
Sullivan and Cromwell, the Association for Investment Management and Research, Merrill
Lynch, and the New York City Bar Association, which are available on the SEC Web site at
http://www.sec.gov.
35. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718. Under the law
established inDirks, an insidertrading violation occurs when (1) the tipperbreaches a fiduciary
dutybycommunicatingmaterial nonpublic information, (2) the tippee knows ofthe breach, and
(3) the tipper receives some benefit. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 646-47 (1983).
36. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590,72,593 (proposed Dec.
28, 1999). Under Dirks the insider must breach a fiduciary duty to the issuer to be liable for
insider trading. This is a high hurdle to clear when attempting to prove that an insider's regular
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for corporate officials, rather than stretching existing law and risking inconsistent
results, the SEC (through its rulemaking function) has adopted Regulation FD to
address the problems presented by selective disclosure."
The SEC has made clear that it realizes the possibility that Regulation FD may
have a chilling effect on the disclosure of information by public companies.38
Commentators widely agree that efficient market performance is served by more, not
less, disclosure of information by public companies. For this reason, the SEC has
attempted to tailor Regulation FD to balance the competing interests of Wall Street
and Main Street.39 Regulation FD provides clear rules prohibiting selective disclosure
and encouraging broad public disclosure of information.' Through the adoption of
Regulation FD, the SEC attempts to "promote full and fair disclosure of information
by issuers and enhance the fairness and efficiency of [capital] markets."'" Only time
will tell whether Regulation FD will enhance market efficiency or chill the flow of
information to public markets. In Part II, this Article will analyze the elements of
Regulation FD and discuss their application.
II. ANALYSIS OF REGULATION FD
Regulation FD presents a new enforcement approach to regulating selective
disclosure through the adoption of issuer disclosure rules, which create duties under
communications with analysts are a violation of insider trading laws. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at
662. Moreover, the SEC has stated that enforcement actions charging selective disclosure as
a form of insider trading would have a far greater consequence leading to a chilling effect on
issuers than the impact of Regulation FD. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 51,718 n.16.
37. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718.
38. Id. The "chilling effect" refers to the situations in which corporate officials find it
increasingly difficult to determine when a disclosure of information would be subject to
enforcement under Regulation FD, and consequently they minimize communications with
outsiders and analysts. Id.; see also Letter from Michael S. Caccese, Senior Vice President,
General Counsel and Secretary, Association for Investment Management and Research, to
Jonathan Katz, Secretary, United States Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 8,2000)
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/caccesel.htm; Letter from Carlos M. Morales,
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (May 5, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposedls73199/moralesl.htm.
39. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719.
40. Id. The SEC did not intend to "impede ordinary-course business communications or
expose issuers to liability for non-intentional selective disclosure unless the issuer fails to make
public disclosure after it learns of it." Id.
41.Id.
[Vol. 77:551
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sections 13(a)42 and 15(d)43 of the Exchange Act." It is not an antifraud rule and it is
not intended to create duties under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. As adopted, Regulation FD has narrowed the scope of the proposed rule,46
although questions remain concerning its application.' This Part provides an analysis
of the application of Regulation FD through a discussion of the: .(1) basic
requirements; (2) issuers affected; (3) personnel covered and the scope of
communications; (4) concept ofmateriality; (5) timing ofrequiredpublic disclosures;
(6) method of public disclosures; (7) Securities Act of 1933 issues; and (8) liability
issues.
A. Basic Requirements of Regulation FD
Regulation FD consists of four rules that provide the fundamental guidelines for
42. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994) (requiring expressed
issuers to disclose and file information that the SEC prescribes as "necessary or appropriate for
the proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing").
43. Id. § 78o(d) (requiring certain issuers to disclose and file information that is necessary
for public interest and the protection of investors).
44. In the case of a closed-end investment company the duty to disclose and file
information is created under Section 30 ofthe Investment Company Act of 1940. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-30 (1994 & Supp. 1999). The SEC's authority to adopt Regulation FD is found in 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78i, 78j, 78m, 78o, 78w, 78mm, and 80a-29.
45. Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726. Through Regulation
FD, the SEC approaches the perceived problem of selective disclosure by creating an issuer-
reporting requirement, rather than treating it as a form of manipulative conduct or insider
trading.
46. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (proposed Dec. 28,
1999).
47. In order to prevent the possibility of inappropriate liability and to guard against the
chilling effect on the release of corporate information, the SEC modified Regulation FD from
its proposed release form. The following are summaries of the SEC's five primary
modifications: (1) narrowed the scope so that it does not apply to communications with all
outsiders, rather, it applies only to communications with market professionals and holders of
the issuer's securities under circumstances when it is foreseeable that they will trade on the
information; (2) narrowed the issuer's personnel covered to senior officers and persons who
regularly communicate with the market; (3) expressly provided that a violation of Regulation
FD will not result in an antifraud violation; (4) clearly established the scienter standard as
knowing, or reckless in not knowing, that information disclosed was material and nonpublic;
(5) expressly provided that a violation of Regulation FD will not affect an issuer's eligibility
for short-form registration or resales under Rule 144. Other significant modifications from the
proposed Regulation FD include theexpress exclusions ofcommunications made in connection
with most registered securities offerings and the elimination of foreign governments and
foreign private issuers from the coverage of Regulation FD. See Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719-20; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
64 Fed. Reg. 72,590.
2002]
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the disclosure of nonpublic material information by public companies .4 Rule 1004
of the Regulation presents the formal rule regarding selective disclosure. Under Rule
100,
[w]henever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material
nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to... [certain
enumerated persons] . . . the issuer shall make public disclosure of that
information... [s]imultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and
... [p]romptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.50
48. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2000).
49. Id. § 243. 100.
50. Id. The full text of Rule 100 reads as follows:
(a) Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any
material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any
person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall make
public disclosure of that information as provided in § 243.10 1(e):
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, paragraph (a) of
this section shall apply to a disclosure made to any person outside the issuer:
(i) Who is a broker or dealer, or a person associated with a broker or dealer,
as those terms are defined in Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a));
(ii) Who is an investment adviser, as that term is defined in Section 202(a)(1 1)
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(l 1)); an
institutional investment manager, as that term is defined in Section 13(f)(5) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(f)(5)), that filed a report
on Form 13F (17 CFR 249.325) with the Commission for the most recent
quarter ended prior to the date of the disclosure; or a person associated with
either of the foregoing. For purposes of this paragraph, a "person associated
with an investment adviser or institutional investment manager" has the
meaning set forth in Section 202(a)(17) of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(17)), assuming for these purposes that an
institutional investment manager is an investment adviser;
(iii) Who is an investment company, as defined in Section 3 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3), or who would be an investment
companybutfor Section 3(c)(1) (15 U.S.C. 80a-3 (c)(1)) or Section 3(c)(7) (15
U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(7)) thereof, or an affiliated person of either of the foregoing.
For purposes of this paragraph, "affiliated person" means only those persons
described in Section 2(a)(3)(C), (D), (E), and (F) ofthe Investment Company
Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(3)(C), (D), (E), and (F)), assuming for these
purposes that a person who would be an investment company but for Section
3(c)(1) (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1)) or Section 3(c)(7) (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(7)) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 is an investment company; or
(iv) Who is a holder of the issuer's securities, under circumstances in which
it is reasonably foreseeable that the person will purchase or sell the issuer's
securities on the basis of the information.
[Vol. 77:551
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The basic elements of Regulation FD require that when a public company makes
an intenitional disclosure of material nonpublic information to enumerated persons,
the company must do so in a manner which simultaneously provides the information
to the generalpublic. 1 Alternatively, when selective disclosure is non-intentional, the
company must publicly disclose the released information promptly after it knows that
the information was material and nonpublic.5 2
This Article will now analyze the primary elements of Regulation FD that function
to define the scope of its application.
B. Issuers Subject to Regulation FD
An "issuer" subject to Regulation FD is any company with securities registered
under section 12 of the Exchange Act,' or any company subject to the reporting
requirements of section 15(d) oftheExchange Act' 4 including closed-end investment
companies.ss Specifically excluded from the definition of "issuers" (therefore not
subject to Regulation FD) are non-closed-erd investment companies, 6 foreign
governments, and foreign private issuers.' The SEC has exempted foreign
governments and foreign private issuers from Regulation FD in a manner consistent
with their existing exemption from quarterly and 8-K filings. However, foreign
(2) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to a disclosure made:
(i) To a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer (such as
an attorney, investment banker, or accountant);
(ii) To a person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in
confidence;
(iii) To an entity whose primary business is the issuance of credit ratings,
provided the information is disclosed solely for the purpose of developing a
credit rating and the entity's ratings are publicly available; or
(iv) In connection with a securities offering registered under the Securities
Act, other than an offering of the type described in any of Rule 415(a)(l)(i)-
(vi) (§ 230.415(a)(1)(i)-(vi) of this chapter).
Id. Rule 101 provides the definition for certain key terms used in Regulation FD. Id. § 243.101.
51. Id. § 243.100.
52.Id.
53.15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1994).
54. Id. § 78o(d).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b).
56. Regulation FD applies to closed-end investment companies; however, it does not
apply to other types of investment companies. The SEC believes that Regulation FD would
provide limited additional protection to investors in investment companies because these
companies continuously offer securities to the public and are under ongoing disclosure
obligations to disclose material information. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed.
Reg. 72,590, 72,597 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101 (b) (the terms "foreign government" and "foreign private issuer"
are defined at 17 C.F.R. § 230.405).
58. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,724 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 240,243, and 249).
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governments and foreign private issuers remain obligated under the rules of the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and National Association of Security Dealers
Automated Quotations ("NASDAQ") to make timely reports of material
information,"9 and their disclosures remain subject to the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws.'
C. Issuer Personnel Covered by Regulation FD
and the Scope of Communications
Regulation FD provides that whenever an "issuer, or person acting on its behalf'"
selectively discloses information to any "person described"'62 in the regulation, such
issuer shall publicly disclose that information. 3 The issues presented are: (1) who are
the personnel acting on behalf of the issuer covered by Regulation FD; and (2) who
are the enumerated recipients of the selectively disclosed information covered under
Regulation FD.
1. Communications by a Person Acting on Behalf of an Issuer
Under Regulation FD, a person acting on behalf of the issuer includes any "senior
official of the issuer.., or any other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer who
regularly communicates with [market professionals] ... or with holders of the
issuer's securities."'" Regulation FD covers only senior management, investor and
public relations professionals, and any other employees who regularly communicate
and interact with Wall Street professionals or security holders of the company as part
of their employment responsibilities.6 Therefore, issuers are not responsible for
selective disclosure made by mid-level management or junior employees who do not
regularly communicate with market professionals or security holders." Although
issuers are not responsible for selective disclosure made by mid-level and low-level
employees, issuers cannot avoid liability under Regulation FD by having noncovered
persons make the selective disclosure.6 The SEC has provided that if a senior officer
directs an employee not otherwise considered to be "acting on behalf' of the issuer
to selectively disclose information, the senior officer will be liable for the
59. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 2 (2000), Nasdaq Rules 4310(c)(16) &
4320(e)(14) (2000).
60. Foreign governments and foreign private issuers are subject to antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws provided that the jurisdictional requirements are met. See
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724-25. Also, the adopting release
notes that the SEC plans to undertake a "comprehensive review of the reporting requirements
of foreign private issuers." Id. at 51,724.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 243.101(c).
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disclosure."'
Regulation FD further provides that "[a]n officer, director, employee, or agent of
an issuer who discloses material nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust
of confidence to the issuer shall not be considered to be acting on behalf of the
issuer."69 Hence, the issuer is not responsible underRegulation FD when an employee
improperly trades or tips. As a practical matter, an investment banker or lawyer
engaged by the issuer, or a party to a confidentiality agreement (for example, an
agreement contained in, or accompanying, a confidential private placement
memorandum) will not be considered to act on "behalf of the issuer" if he discloses
material nonpublic information in breach of his duty of trust and confidence to the
issuer."0 However, the individual who violates his duty to the issuer may be subject
to insider trading liability as a tipper."
2. Communications to Enumerated Persons
The SEC designed Regulation FD to address the problem of selective disclosure
made to individuals who would be expected to trade securities on the information or
advise others about securities trading.' Correspondingly, Regulation FD enumerates
four categories of covered individuals to whom selective disclosure shall notbe made
unless specifically excluded from coverage. 3 The first category includes brokers and
dealers and their associated persons. 4 The second category includes investment
advisors, certain institutional investment managers, and their associated persons."
The third category consists of investment companies and affiliatedpersons 6 The first
three categories of enumerated persons will include sell-side analysts, buy-side
analysts, institutional money managers, and other Wall Street professionals who are
likely to buy or sell securities on the basis of selective disclosures. Finally, the fourth
category of enumerated persons are holders of the issuer's securities that are likely
to trade on the basis of selectively disclosed information." Regulation FD does not
68.Id.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c).
70. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
71. Id.; see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662-63 (1983). If an issuer adopts a policy
that limits which senior officials are authorized to speak to Wall Street professionals; a
selective disclosure by a senior officer who is not authorized to speak will not violate
Regulation FD, but may subject that officer to insider trading liability because he breached his
duty of trust and confidence to the issuer. Seee. g., Division of Corporation Finance, Securities
and Exchange Commission, Manual of Publicly-Available Telephone Interpretations
Regulation FD Telephone Interpretations, Question 14 (4th Supp. Oct. 2000), at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephonelphonesupplement4.htm [hereinafter Telephone
Interpretations].
72. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1).
74. Id. § 243. 100(b)(l)(i).
75. Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(ii).
76. Id. § 243.100(b)(l)(iii).
77. Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv).
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cover persons who are engaged in ordinary course of business communications with
the issuer, nor will Regulation FD interfere with disclosures to the media or
government agencies."
Regulation FD sets out four types of disclosure that are specifically excluded from
coverage, even when made to an enumerated person. The first exclusion pertains to
communications made to persons who owe the issuer a duty of trust and confidence.79
These persons include temporary insiders such as investment bankers, lawyers, and
accountants. 0 The second exclusion from Regulation FD applies to persons who
expressly agree to maintain the disclosed information in confidence." However, any
misuse of the information for securities trading by persons enumerated in the first two
exclusions would be covered under the "temporary insider" 2 or "misappropriation"83
theory of insider trading." The SEC applies this exclusionary approach recognizing
that issuers must share material nonpublic information with outsiders for legitimate
business purposes.8 5
The third exclusion is for disclosures made to an entity whose primary function is
the issuance of credit ratings, provided the information is disclosed for the sole
purpose of developing a credit rating and the ratings are publicly available. 6 The
fourth exclusion from the coverage of Regulation FD pertains to communications
made in connection with securities offerings registered under the Securities Act.8
This fourth exclusion is discussed in greater detail in Part II.G.1 of this Article.
D. Materiality
RegulationFD applies to the selective disclosure ofmaterialnonpublic information
about the issuer or its securities.88 However, the regulation does not define "material"
nonpublic information. 9 The SEC intends to rely on the existing definition of
materialnonpublic information that has developed from case law.' In TSCIndustries,
78. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,718 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249).
79. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(i).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994); see also 17.C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000); SECv. Lund, 570
F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (presenting the "constructive insider" and "temporary insider"
theories of insider trading liability).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.10b5-1; United States
v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (presenting the "misappropriation" theory of insider trading
liability).
84. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,720 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249).
85. Id.
86. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(iii).
87. Id. § 243.100(b)(2)(iv).
88. Id. § 243.100.
89. See Id. § 243.101.
90. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
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Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court established that a "fact is material ifthere
is a substantial likelihood that areasonable shareholder would consider it important!"
in making an investment decision. In a later case, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,93 the
Supreme Court provided further that information is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that it "would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." With respect to
contingent or speculative events, materiality will depend on a balancing test weighing
the "indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of
the event in light of the totality of company activity." 5
Regulation FD also does not define the term "nonpublic."' s Rather, it relies on the
judicially created securities law concept that "[i]nformation is nonpublic if it has not
been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors generally." '97 In
determining whether or not a piece of information is nonpublic, the standard is
whether the information has beenproperlyreleased and whetherpublic investors have
had a sufficiently long period to consider the information.9" Whether this standard is
met depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case."
In its adopting release, the SEC does not establish a bright-line test or an exclusive
list of material items for the purposes of defining materiality under Regulation FD.
However, the SEC has provided a list of information and events "that should be
reviewed carefully to determine whether they are material."'" The list includes:
1) earnings information; 2) mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and tender
offers; 3) significant changes in assets; 4) new product development and
resource discoveries; 5) significant developments regarding customers and
91. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
92. Id. at 449.
93. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
94. Id. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
95. Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf'Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
96. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-.103 (2000).
97. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) (citing Texas GulfSulphur Co., 401'
F.2d at 854 (2d Cir. 1968) and In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633,643 (1971)).
98. See In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 255-56 (1973); see also Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d at 854-55.
99. For information to be public, it must generally be disseminated through recognized
channels of public distribution such as major news networks. However, if an issuer has filed
a report on EDGAR in compliance with the Exchange Act, the information furnished is public
and can therefore be disseminated to a select audience so long as the issuer confirms, prior to
disclosure, that the report received a filing date no later than the date of disclosure. No
reasonable waiting period is required following EDGAR filing. For example, under Regulation
FD, a issuer can file a report on Form 8-K via EDGAR at 10:00 A.M., receive confirmation of
the filling date at 10:10 A.M., and disclose the information to a private audience at 10:11 A.M.
See Telephone Interpretations, supra note 71, Regulation FD Telephone Interpretations,
Question 6.
100. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
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suppliers; 6) changes in control; 7) changes in management and senior
personnel; 8) change in accountants or auditor notification that the issuer may
no longer rely on auditor's reports; 9) bankruptcies or receiverships; and 10)
events regarding the company's securities.101
This list should not be considered as an enumeration of per se material facts or
events. Given the imprecision of the materiality standard, it is difficult to state for
certain what types of information willbe considered material and what types will not.
It seems likely, however, that disclosures regarding the listed topics require issuers
to treat such information as material.
In addition to case law, the proposing release cites to alternative SEC rules,
regulations, and releases on materiality."' It is significant that the SEC references its
StaffAccounting Bulletin No. 99 ("SAB 99").103 The SEC's discussion ofmateriality
in SAB 99 suggests that information that would not seem to be material under the
applicable case law standard may be material under SAB 99.4 SAB 99, which
addresses materiality for the purposes of financial statements, warns that financial
items that may seem quantitatively immaterial, may be material. 5 In SAB 99, the
SEC sets forth a materiality test that involves both quantifiable and qualitative
factors."° According to SAB 99, an "[e]valuation of materiality requires a registrant
and its auditors to consider all relevant circumstances."'0 7 The potential market
reaction should be a guiding consideration in determining whether information is
material.)° As a practical matter, there are three situations in which the materiality
standard is directly relevant to the daily operations and practices of issuers. The
situations are: 1) analysts seeking guidance regarding earnings forecasts; 2)
disclosure of a nonpublic piece of information that an analyst uses to complete a
101. Id. "This list puts the world on notice that an intentional or reckless disclosure of
information falling into one of these categories is likely to draw the attention of the
Enforcement Division." Richard H. Walker, Director, Division ofEnforcement, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Speech Before the Compliance & Legal Division of the Securities
Industry Association (Nov. 1, 2000), at http:l/www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch4l5.htm).
102. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 n.38 (citing Rule
405 under the Securities Act, Rule 12b-2 under the Exchange Act, and Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99).
103. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211) (discussing materiality for the purposes of financial statements).
104. See id.
105. Id. at 45,152.
106. Id. The factors considered are: I) is the item capable of precise measurement, or is
it based on an estimate; 2) does the item impact the trend in earnings or other key items; 3) is
the item consequential to meeting analysts' consensus expectations; 4) does the item change
results from positive to negative; 5) is the item significant to a segment; 6) is the item
consequential to compliance with regulatory requirements or loan or other contractual
requirements; 7) does the item affect compensation; and 8) is there significant market reaction
to the information. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis in original).
108. Id.
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"mosaic" of information that is material; and 3) issuers making judgments whether
information is material.
1. Earnings Forecasts
A prevailing issue that raises concerns underRegulationFD is the industrypractice
of securities analysts seeking guidance from companies regarding earnings forecasts.
While far broader in its application, Regulation FD was adopted primarily to deal
with this precise situation. When an issuer's Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") enters
a private conversation with a securities analyst .who is looking for guidance on
earnings estimates, the CFO assumes a high level of risk under Regulation FD. "9 If
the CFO privatelydiscloses to the analyst "nonpublic information that the company's
anticipated earnings will be higher than, lower than, or even the same as what the
analysts have been forecasting, the issuer likelywill have violated Regulation FD.".
Affirming an earnings estimate, or walking the street up or down, will likely be
considered as providing material information and can no longer be done privately." '
However, there are situations, such as affirming an earnings forecast shortly after
it is publicly disclosed, when the affirmation would not be considered material and
therefore not in violation of Regulation FD." For an issuer to rely on this position
concerning a one-on-one conversation with an analyst shortly after a public release
of information, the issuer should be certain that no additional information is disclosed
and the conversation occurs immediately following the public release. As a preventive
measure, issuers may want to avoid such one-on-one conversations with analysts by
directing them to the information that has recently been made publicly accessible.
This practice would prevent situations in which issuers are placed on the spot to make
judgment calls concerning materiality, thereby taking on the risk of violating
Regulation FD.
When corporate officers undertake private conversations with Wall Street
professionals concerning earnings estimates and projections, they assume great risk
under Regulation FD. Through the adoption of Regulation FD, issuers have been put
on notice that the SEC will view with skepticism any claims that no material
nonpublic information was provided in one-on-ones and other private
communications with Wall Street."' A public company is likely to face an uphill
battle in proving that no material earnings information was disclosed in private
109. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,721 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249)..
110. Id.
11l. Walker, supra note 101, at 6. The possible scenario where a reasonable investor
would not consider the information important in making an investment decision could be an
earnings call with an analyst right after the issuer has publicly disclosed information in
compliance with Regulation FD. In that situation, the CFO may be able to walk the analyst up
and down without violating Regulation FD because the substance ofthe discussion would not
be a material nonpublic disclosure. See id; see also Telephone Interpretations, supra note 71,
Regulation FD Telephone Interpretations, Question 1.
112. Id.
113. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721-22.
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communications with Wall Street, particularly if analysts adjust their forecasts
following the private conversation.' Moreover, the SEC specifically provides that
earnings information communicated through indirect guidance is material and will be
equally subject to Regulation FD."'
2. Mosaic Theory
Under Regulation FD, a public company cannot disclose material information by
breaking it into small, nonmaterial pieces." 6 Thus, slicing information so thin that
each individual piece is nonmaterial will not work. At the same time, a company "is
not prohibited from disclosing a nonmaterial piece of information to an analyst, even
if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst complete a 'mosaic' of
information that, taken together, is material."' "'7 In Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.," 8
the Second Circuit provided that a "skilled analyst with knowledge of the company
and the industry may piece seemingly inconsequential data together with public
information into a mosaic which reveals material non-public information."" 9 In the
release adopting Regulation FD, the SEC announced that the mosaic theory
articulated in Elkind is alive and well. 2
The phrase "unbeknownst to the issuer'' (as stated in the adopting release) is a
new addition to the mosaic theory and does not appear in Elkind. It is unclear and
unlikely that an issuer's lack of awareness is a necessary condition of the mosaic
theory. In SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.," the court stated that "corporate
management may reveal to securities analysts or inquirers non-public information that
merely fills intricacies in analysis."'" Therefore, it appears that an officer of the
issuer can knowingly convey an immaterial fact to an analyst.' 24 What an issuer must
be cautious of, however, is not knowingly breaking a material piece of information
down into immaterial pieces and disclosing them to an analyst in a nonpublic manner.
Further, a dichotomy exists between the reasonable investor and the sophisticated
investor or analyst. An issuer may selectively disclose information that is not
114. See id.
115. Id. The SEC intended Regulation FD to apply to code terms or any other type of
indirect or implied earnings guidance. Therefore, any implied guidance or code language has
the same status and poses the same potential liability as a direct communication. See id. The
Walker speech provides that using a code language is one of the cases the Division of
Enforcement will be interested in pursuing. Walker, supra note 101, at 6.
116. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
117. Id.
118. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
119. Id. at 165 (emphasis added) (citing Parker, Ethical Issuesfor the FinancialAnalyst,
in CORPORATE FINANCiAL REPORTING: ETHICAL AND OTHER PROBLEMs 165, 167 (1972)).
120. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
121. Id.
122. 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
123. Id. at 14.
124. See Elkind, 635 F.2d at 165-66; see also Bausch & Lomb, 565 F.2d at 14-15;
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
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important to the reasonable investor (therefore not material) and is important to a
sophisticated investor or analyst." The SEC has stated that "[t]he focus of
Regulation FD is on whether the issuer discloses material nonpublic information, not
whether an analyst, through some combination of persistence, knowledge, and
insight, regards as material information whose significance is not apparent to the
reasonable investor."'26 Therefore, Regulation FD is not violated where an issuer
discloses immaterial information that is significant in completing an analyst's mosaic
of information."7
3. Judgment Concerning Materiality
An area of concern under Regulation FD is an issuer's responsibility for officers'
judgment calls concerning whether information is material. It is inevitable that
corporate officials will be placed on the spot to make judgment calls concerning
materiality in response to questions asked in private conversations. In answer to this
concern, Regulation FD provides that an issuer acts intentionally only if the person
"knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the information he... is communicating
is both material andnonpublic.' 'I Therefore, an issuerwill not "intentionally" violate
Regulation FD unless he "knows, or is reckless in not knowing""' that disclosed
information is both material and nonpublic."' This standard for intentional
disclosures provides protection to corporate officials against being second-guessed
by the SEC in enforcement actions for judgments concerning materiality in close
cases. The dichotomy between intentional and non-intentional disclosures is
addressed in the following Subpart.
E. Timing ofRequired Public Diselosures
A primary element of Regulation FD is the timing of a required public disclosure
depending on whether the company has made an intentional or non-intentional
selective disclosure of information.' The required timing differs in the two
following situations: 1) the issuer has made an intentional selective disclosure of
information; and 2) the issuer has made a selective disclosure that was not
intentional. 32
125. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722 ("[M]ateriality is
an objective test keyed to the reasonable investor; Regulation FD will not be implicated where
an issuer discloses immaterial information whose significance is discerned by the analyst.").
126. Id.
127. Id. at 51,722.
128. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2000); see also id. (discussing adoption of
intentional standard).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a).
130. Id.




1. Intentional Selective Disclosure
As previously mentioned, a selective disclosure is intentional when a person acting
on behalf of the issuer making the disclosure knows, or is reckless in not knowing,
prior to making the disclosure, that the information he is providing is both material
and nonpublic.' Regulation FD does not define "reckless"; however, the SEC has
stated that it intends to rely on the prevailing judicial definition of the term.' Based
on judicial interpretation, "reckless" is defined as "extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care"'36 and the SEC notes that "recklessness" is also
determined bythe specific context involved." 7 For example, the SEC provides in the
adopting release that a "materiality judgement that might be reckless in the context
of a prepared written statement would not necessarily be reckless in the context of an
impromptu answer to an unanticipated question." "' It is unlikely that companies
engaged in good faith efforts to comply with Regulation FD will be considered
reckless in making disclosures. 39
Under Regulation FD, if an issuer makes an intentional disclosure, it is required
to make a public disclosure of the same information simultaneously."4 Although
Regulation FD does not define "simultaneously,"'' the Black's Law Dictionary
definition of the word is: "two or more occurrences or happenings [that] are identical
in time.' 42 Taken at its literal meaning, "simultaneously" means that if an issuer
makes an intentional selective disclosure it must also make a public disclosure of the
same information at the exact same time. If an issuer intentionally discloses material
nonpublic information and fails to simultaneously make a public disclosure of that
information, the issuer violates Regulation PD. 43 Conversely, if an issuer
simultaneously discloses the information to thepublic, there is no selective disclosure
violation under Regulation FD.'"
133. Id. § 243.101 (a); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at
51,722.
134. See 17 C.F.R. § 243. 100-.101.
135. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722 (citing Hollinger
v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568 (9th Cir. 1990)).
136. Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1568.
137. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
138. Id.
139. Id. The Walker speech states that the recklessness standard means "[the SEC is] not
going to second-guess close calls regarding themateriality ofapotential disclosure. An issuer's
incorrect determination that information is not material must represent an 'extreme departure'
from the standards of reasonable care in order for us to allege a violation of [Regulation] FD."
The Walker speech provides that using a code language is one of the cases the Division of
Enforcement will be interested in pursuing. Walker, supra note 101, at 4.
140. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(1) (2000).
141. See id. § 243.100-.101.
142. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (6th ed. 1990).
143. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(1).
144. Id. (for intentional disclosures of material nonpublic information, public disclosure
must be made prior to or contemporaneous with the communication of the information).
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2. Non-Intentional Selective Disclosure
If a company makes a non-intentional 4" disclosure of material nonpublic
information, it must make public disclosure of that information promptly."
Regulation FD defines "promptly" to mean
as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of (twenty-
four] hours or the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York
Stock Exchange) after a senior official" of the issuer ... learns that there has
been a non-intentional disclosure... of information that the senior official
knows, or is reckless in not knowing, is both material and nonpublic. 48
Regulation FD allows prompt public disclosure to remedy a good faith mistake by
an issuer. By way of illustration, if a CFO selectively discloses information to an
analyst that he did not think was material, but the information causes the stock price
to move, the issuer can promptly issue a press release and not violate Regulation
FD." The public release of the selectively disclosed information must be made
within twenty-four hours of the initial disclosure or prior to opening the next day's
trading on the NYSE.'" The opening of trading on the NYSE is used as the reference
point for all issuers, regardless of whether those issuer's shares are traded on
NASDAQ or the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX").
The requirement to make a prompt disclosure is triggered when a senior officer
learns that there has been a non-intentional selective disclosure that the "senior
officer knows, or is reckless in not knowing, is both material and nonpublic."''
Under Regulation FD, an issuer's requirement to promptly disclose information arises
only when the following three elements are satisfied: 1) the issuer learns that
information has been disclosed; 2) the issuer knows, or is reckless in not knowing,
that the information disclosed is material; and 3) the issuer knows, or is reckless in
145. Regulation FD does not define "non-intentional." However, the proposing release
describes "non-intentional" as "an honest slip of the tongue, or (where] the individual
mistakenly (but not in reckless disregard of the truth) believed the information had already been
made public." Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,596
(proposed Dec. 28, 1999).
146. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(2).
147. Seniorofficial is defined as "anydirector, executive officer (as defined in [17 C.F.R.]
§ 240.3b-7 ... ), investor relations or public relations officer, or other person with similar
functions." Id. § 243.101(f).
148. Id. § 243.101(d).
149. See id. § 243.100(a)(2).
150. Id. § 243.101(d). For example, if the non-intentional selective disclosure of material
nonpublic information is discovered Friday afternoon, the outer limit for making public
disclosure is the commencement oftrading on theNYSE on Monday. See Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,723 (Aug. 24,2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 243, and 249).
151. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d).
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not knowing, that the information is nonpublic.' The prompt disclosure rule' for
non-intentional selective disclosures provides issuers, acting in good faith, time to
determine how to respond after discovering the disclosure error. Importantly, this
time clock does not begin to run until the three aforementioned elements have
occurred."
F. Methods of Public Disclosure Required by Regulation FD
In the case of a non-intentional selective disclosure, the company is required to
make prompt "public disclosure"'' 5 of that information.'m And, as previously
mentioned, in the case of intentional selective disclosure, the company is required to
make simultaneous "public disclosure."' 57 Under Regulation FD, the company has a
great deal of flexibility in determining the method of required public disclosure.'
Specifically, Regulation FD provides that "public disclosure" maybe made by either:
I) "furnishing... or filing.. . a Form 8-K;"'5 or 2) "disseminat[ing] the information
through another method (or combination of methods) of disclosure that is reasonably
designed to provide broad, nonexclusionary distribution of the information to the
public."'16
1. Form 8-K Disclosure
One option issuers have when required to make a public disclosure is "filing" or
"furnishing" information on Form 8-K.' 6' Issuers who decide to make public
disclosure via Form 8-K must make a subsequent decision whether to "file"'" or
152. Id.
153. Id. § 243.100(a)(2).
154. See id. § 243.10 1(d).
155. Id. § 243.100(a).
156. See id. § 243.100(a), (a)(2).
157. Id. § 243.100(a).
158. See id. § 243. 10 1 (e); see also Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 65 Fed. Reg.
51,715, 51,723 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.RL pts. 240, 243, and 249).
159. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(1).
160. Id. § 243.101(e)(2).
161. Id. § 243.101(e)(1). Issuers whose securities are registered under § 12 of the
Exchange Act are reporting companies, and are generally required to make filings (Form 10-K
annual, Form 10-Q quarterly, and Form 8-K special events) with the SEC under § 13(a) or §
15(d) of the Exchange Act. Form 8-K is a special report filed with the SEC that provides
disclosure of ongoing special events that occur between the required reporting dates. Reporting
companies must file a Form 8-K for specific, limited events, such as bankruptcy, significant
mergers or acquisitions, or a director's controversial resignation. Form 8-K is a mechanism for
issuers to provide ongoing information to the SEC and securities trading markets. Form 8-K,
5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,002-03 (2001) (Form 8-K shall be used for current reports
under § 13 or § 15(d) of the Exchange Act, filed pursuant to Rule 13a-1 1 or Rule 15d- 11).
162. Filed information is provided under revised Item 5 of Form 8-K. 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
at 31,003.
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"furnish"'" the information."6 If an issuer chooses to "file" the information pursuant
to Item 5 of Form 8-K (Other Events and Regulation FD Disclosure),' 65 the
information will be subject to liability under Section 18 of the Exchange Act.'" The
"filed" information is also subject to automatic incorporation by reference into the
issuer's SecurityAct registration statements that are subjectto liabilityunder Sections
16 7 and 12(a)(2) 161 of the Securities Act.69 Should the issuer choose to "furnish" the
information under Item 9 of Form 8-K (Regulation FD Disclosures), 70 "it will not be
subject to liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act or Section 18 of the
Exchange Act for the disclosure, unless it takes steps to include that disclosure in a
filed report, proxy statement, or registration statement."'
7
'
In selecting this method of public disclosure, information provided on Form 8-K
(whether filed or furnished) remains subject to the antifraudprovisions of the federal
securities laws."7 Other Exchange Act filings, such as a proxy statement7 3 or a Form
I0-Q,174 also satisfy Regulation FD's public disclosure requirementprovided they are
timely and not buried in the filing or disclosed in piecemeal fashion throughout the
163. Furnished information is provided under new Item 9 of Form 8-K. 5 Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. at 31,0024.
164. The SEC stated in the adopting release that"filing or furnishing information on Form
8-K solely to satisfy Regulation FD will not, by itself, be deemed an admission as to the
materiality of the information." Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715,
51,723 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249).
165. The SEC specifically revised Item 5 of Form 8-K to be titled "Other Events and
Regulation FD Disclosure" which allows issuers to file information under Regulation FD that
may or may not be material, without precluding a later determination that the information was
not material. See id.
166. Id. Section 18 of the Exchange Act is a rarely used express antifraud action, with a
relaxed culpability standard, that has a confined focus on "filed" documents and a heightened
reliance requirement. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1994).
Section 18 is rarely used because the plaintiff must establish "eyeball reliance" on a filed
document in order to prevail. However, with the widespread use of EDGAR by all market
participants, Section 18 could become a popular field of litigation for plaintiffs.
167. See supra text accompanying note 2.
168. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1997). Under § 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act, purchasers in a securities offering may seek rescission damages from statutory
sellers if the offering was conducted "by means of a prospectus or oral communication" that
was false or misleading. Id.
169. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723.
170. Information furnished under Item 9 of Form 8-K will not be deemed "filed" for SEC
purposes. 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,004 (2001); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723.
171. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723.
172. Id.
173. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78n (1994) (Section 14 of the
Exchange Act regulates proxy voting by shareholders in public corporations).
174. See supra text accompanying note 157.
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filing.'15Although filing and furnishing information to the SEC through administrative
procedural mechanisms is one method of meeting the public disclosure requirement,
alternative methods give issuers flexibility in choosing the means of distributing
information.
2. Alternative Methods of Public Disclosure
In lieu of filing or furnishing information in Form 8-K, an issuer may disseminate
the information through another method or combination of methods that are
reasonably designed to provide broad, nonexclusionary, distribution of the
information to the public. 76 These methods could include: 1) disseminating a press
release through a widely circulated news or wire service such as Bloomberg, Dow
Jones, PRNewswire, orBusiness Wire; 2) announcements made atpress conferences
for which adequate notice has been given and the public has been granted access; or
3) telephonic or electronic transmission of conferences for which the public has been
given adequate notice and the means of access. "' Regulation FD does not require the
use of any particular method of disclosure. Preferably, the SEC leaves the choice
to the issuer to select a method or combination of methods that are reasonably
planned to make a broad public disclosure considering the particular circumstances
of the situation. 1
79
The language of Regulation FD states that an issuer can use a method "or
combination of methods"'80 of public dissemination of information. This should be
interpreted to suggest that a single method of disclosure may, or may not, be
sufficient to provide broad public disclosure."" Based on Regulation FD and the
adopting release, it is unclear when an issuer can rely on a single method of
disclosure or whether multiple public disclosures are necessary." The SEC does
provide the following model which depicts an approved combination of methods for
making aplanned disclosure of material information. First, the company should issue
apress release through regular media channels containing the information.' Second,
the company should hold a conference call to discuss the announced information and
notify the public by another press release or Web site posting of the time and date of
the call and instructions for accessing the call.'" Third, the aforementioned
conference call should be open to the public either by telephone or through Internet
175. Telephone Interpretations, supra note 71, Regulation FD Telephone Interpretations,
Question 1.
176. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(2) (2000).
177. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723-24.
178. Id. at 51,724.
179. 17 C.F.R. § 243. 101 (e)(2);see also Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 51,724.
180. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(2).
181. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724.
182. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(2); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723-24.
183. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724.
184. Id.
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webcasting, but the public need not participate in the call, which could be conducted
in listen-only mode.' By following these steps, a company can use a press release
to broadly disseminate information to the public and then hold a public conference
call discussing the release with analysts without danger of selectively disclosing
material information.'"
Currently, itis unclear whether webcasting andposting information on the issuer's
Web site, in and of itself, constitutes a sufficient method of public disclosure under
Regulation FD. 7 In one instance, the adopting release states that "electronic
transmissions (including the use of the Internet)"' 8 is an acceptable method."s In
another instance, the adopting release states that the "posting of information on the
issuer's website maynot now, by itself, be a sufficient means of public disclosure."''
Therefore, it is clear that posting information on an issuer's Web site can be used in
combination with other methods of public disclosure-yet, the release is ambiguous
about whether Web sites that are widely followed by the investing public may, by
themselves, be an acceptable method of public disclosure. 9' Issuers who choose to
use their Web sites as the sole means of making a public disclosure assume the risk
and burden of establishing that the method was "reasonably designed to provide
broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information."'"
While Regulation FD gives issuers flexibility in choosing an appropriate method
of public disclosure (in addition to the use of a Form 8-K), it also places on them the
responsibility to select methods that are "reasonably designed" to effect broad public
distribution. 93 In determining whether an issuer's disclosure was "reasonably
designed," the SEC will "consider all the relevant facts and circumstances,
recognizing that methods of disclosure that maybe effective for some issuers may not
185. Id. The SEC has noted that issuers should consider making the conference call or
webcast available for a reasonable time after the call is held in order to allow people who
missed the call or webcast to access it later. See id. at n.73. However, issuers should also be
cautious and limit this access period to prevent staleness of the information.
186. Id. at 51,724.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 51,723.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 51,724.
191. See Id. at 51,723-24.
192. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(2) (2000). The SEC has stated, "As
technology evolves and more investors have access to and use the Internet... we believe that
some issuers, whose [Web sites] are widely followed by the investment community, could use
such a method." Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724. From the
tone that the SEC takes in this statement referring to Web site disclosure as a sole method of
public disclosure, it seems that currently Web site disclosure, by itself, is a frowned upon
method of public disclosure. Change in this position is expected as issuers continue to
experiment with various media techniques, as Internet media technology improves, and as the
public becomes more sophisticated in its use of technology.
193. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(1), (e)(2); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724.
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be effective for others."'94 Even generally acceptable methods of public disclosure
may not be reasonable for certain issuers." Smaller issuers should take note of the
SEC's warning that, where an issuer knows that its press releases are not routinely
disseminated by business wire services, it is not sufficient to make a public disclosure
simplyby releasing information to suchwire services." 6 In this case, the smaller, less
well-known issuer should use adifferent or an additional reasonably designed method
of public disclosure. 97
When determining the reasonableness of the method of public disclosure,
deviations from usual disclosure practices may well affect the SEC's judgment
because the changes may not be in line with investors' expectations."" Under
Regulation FD, the SEC may look skeptically upon an issuer's judgment that a last-
minute webcast of quarterly earnings results would provide effective public
disclosure if the issuer typically disclosed quarterly earnings in a press release."9
Although ambiguity surrounds the Regulation FD requirements for making a
particular public disclosure, the SEC attempts to add some clarity by providing that
its judgment concerning the sufficiency of a given method is made with respect to
what is reasonable in light of all the relevant facts and circumstances.2 ' There is no
"tone size fits all" standard for public disclosure. Rather, the issuer must choose
methods of disclosure based on the particular circumstances of the situation."'
G. Application of Regulation FD to Securities Act Issues
The adoption of Regulation FD raises issues concerning the interplay of the
disclosure requirements of the Securities Act and the new selective disclosure
prohibitions.20 2 The concern is whether Regulation FD applies to disclosures made
by a reporting issuer in connection with an offering under the Securities Act.2 3 If that
is the case, the public disclosure requirement of Regulation FD may cause issuers to
violate Section 52" of the Securities Act.' 5 The question is whether the public
194. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724.
195. See id.
196. Id. For some issuers, Form 8-K may very well be the only sure way of complying
with the Regulation FD public disclosure requirement. See id.
197. Different or additional methods of public disclosure include 1) furnishing or filing
a Form 8-K; 2) providing the information to local media; 3) posting the information on the
company Web site; or 4) using a local service that distributes the information to a variety of




201. See id. at 51,723.
202. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1994) (Section 5 of the Securities Act);
see also Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-.103 (2000).
203. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 77e. Section 5 places restrictions on the type of disclosures that issues
can make during the registration process.
205. Id. Section 5 governs the release and delivery of information during the registration
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disclosure obligation under Regulation FD directly conflicts with the disclosure
mandates of the Securities Act.2 The specific Securities Act issues addressed are:
(1) Regulation FD's application to registered offerings; (2) Regulation FD's
application to unregistered offerings; and (3) Regulation FD's impact on issuers'
eligibility for short-form registration and Rule 144.2°7
1. Registered Offerings
With a few exceptions,0 8 Regulation FD does not apply to disclosures released in
connection with securities offerings that are registered under the Securities Act. The
SEC has determined that apprehensions about selective disclosure of information in
connection with registered offerings should not be handled by superimposing
Regulation FD over the current regulatory regime imposed by the Securities Act.2"
Further, under the Securities Act, the required disclosure standard and the liability
provisions substantially limit any considerable opportunity for a company to
selectively disclose information in connection with a registered offering.21 ° The key
effect ofthis exemption is to exclude investor roadshows and other marketing efforts
process. Section 5 separates the registration process into three time periods: (1) during the
prefiling period the offering and sale of any security is prohibited (§§ 5(a), 5(c)); (2) during the
waiting period (after the registration statement is filed, but before it is effective), sales are
prohibited, and written offers are strictly regulated (§§ 5(a), 5(b)(1)); and (3) during the post-
effective period, written offers remain subject to regulation and all purchasers must receive a
prospectus that is in compliance with Securities Act specifications (9§ 5(b)(1), 5(b)(2)). Id.
206. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725; see also
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593 (proposed Dec. 28,
1999).
207. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2000).
Rule 144 establishes when control persons or holders of restricted securities can resell them
into public trading markets. Id.
208. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725.
Registered shelf offerings under Rule 415(a)(1)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), or (vi)
are not excluded from the operation of Regulation FD. Those offerings, which
include secondary offerings, dividend or interest reinvestment plans, employee
benefit plans, the exercise of outstanding options, warrants or rights, the
conversion of outstanding securities, pledges of securities as collateral and
issuances of American depositary shares, are generally of an ongoing and
continuous nature. Because of the nature of those offerings, issuers would be
exempt from the operation of Regulation FD for extended periods of time if
the exclusion for registered offerings covered them. Public companies that
engage in these offerings should be accustomed to resolving any Section 5
issues relating to their public disclosure of material information during these
offerings.
Id. at n.80.




from Regulation FD.21 '
This exclusion shields issuers from Section 5 liability, because the disclosure
required under Regulation FD might constitute an "offer 212 of securities for purposes
of Section 5 of the Securities Act and would therefore subject the issuer to liability
for gunjumping or a written communication that is a nonconforming statutory
prospectus provided subsequent to the filing of the registration statement 3 In
deciding that Regulation FD is generally not applicable to registered offerings, the
SEC acknowledged that the Division of Corporation Finance is currently conducting
a review of the Securities Act disclosure system as it operates during the registration
process. 2 4 The SEC goes on to state that it is more appropriate to consider the impact
of selective disclosure, during the registration process, in the broader context of
rulemaking under the Securities Act.215 Regulation FD, as promulgated under the
Exchange Act, is not the most efficient mechanism for regulating disclosure during
the registration process. Rather, Regulation FD would act to frustrate the current
application of Section 5 of the Securities Act.
216
The exemption for selective disclosure in connection with a registered public
offering is available only during the time period in which the issuer is "in
registration." '217 For the purposes of Regulation FD, the SEC has specifically defined
when registered security offerings are considered to begin and end.1 Disclosures that
211. Id.
212. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (1994) (Section 2(a)(3) of the
Securities Act defines "offer" as "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation ofan offer
to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.").
213. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
214. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725.
215. Id.
216. See 15 U.S.C. § 78e; see also Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-.103 (2000);
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725.
217. Securities Act Release No. 5180 defines "in registration" as "the entire process of
registration, at least from the time an issuer reaches an understanding with the broker-dealer
which is to act as managing underwriter prior to the filing of the registration statement and the
period of 40 to 90 days during which dealers must deliver a prospectus." Guidelines for the
Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities are in Registration, Securities Act Release
No. 33-5180, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,506 n.l (Aug. 16, 1971).
218. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(g) (Rule 101(g)). Regulation FD defines "security offering" as
follows:
(g) Securities offering. For purposes of § 243.100(b)(2)(iv):
(1) Underwritten offerings. A securities offering that is underwritten
commences when the issuerreaches an understanding with the broker-dealer
that is to act as managing underwriter and continues until the later of the end
of the period during which a dealer must deliver a prospectus or the sale of the
securities (unless the offering is sooner terminated);
(2) Non-underwritten offerings. A securities offering that is not underwritten:
(i) If covered by Rule 415(a)(1)(x) (§ 230.415(a)(1)(x) of this chapter),
commences when the issuer makes its first bona fide offer in a takedown of
securities and continues until the later of the end of the period during which
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take place outside the specific time periods219 are not considered to be in connection
with a registered offering and, therefore, are not exempt fromRegulationFD.u Also,
Regulation FD will applyto disclosures concerning the ordinary course of business,
regardless of whether the issuer is in the process of making a registered offering." 1
Communications that are not made in connection with a registered offering (even
though they are made within the registration period) are not exempt. Thus, a
statement about projected earnings made in a conference call with Wall Street
analysts would not be considered "in connection withIm the registered offering
merely because the issuer is "in registration." m
2. Unregistered Offerings
Regulation FD applies to communications made in connection with unregistered
offerings. ' Therefore, traditional private placementsP offerings under Rule
144A,' and offerings under Regulation S' are subject to Regulation FD.S Issuers
each dealer must deliver a prospectus or the sale of the securities in that
takedown (unless the takedown is sooner terminated);
(ii) If a business combination as defined in Rule 165(f)(1) (§ 230.165(f)(l) of
this chapter), commences when the first public announcement of the
transaction is made and continues until the completion of the vote or the
expiration of the tender offer, as applicable (unless the transaction is sooner
terminated);
(iii) If an offering other than those specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
section, commences when the issuer files a registration statement and
continues until the later of the end of the period during which each dealer must
deliver a prospectus or the sale of the securities (unless the offering is sooner
terminated).
Id. Rule 101(g), which defines "securities offering," establishes when an offering is considered
to be "in registration" for the purposes for Regulation FD.
219. See text accompanying note 218 for the specific time periods as provided in Rule
101(g) of Regulation FD.
220. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100,.101(g).
221. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725.
222. In the adopting release the SEC provides no guidance for what constitutes a
communication "made in connection with" a registered offering. Most likely, communications
made to prospective investors would qualify for the Regulation FD exemption. As for other
communications, the issue is currently unclear.
223. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725 n.82.
224. Id.
225. See Regulation D-Rules Governing the Limited Offers and Sales of Securities
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-508 (2000)
[hereinafter Regulation D].
226. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2000).
227. See Regulation S-Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside the United
States Without Registration Underthe Securities Actof 1933,17 C.F.R. § 230.901-.905 (2000)
[hereinafter Regulation S]. Foreign private issuers and foreign governments remain exempt
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making an unregistered offering must either publicly disclose the material nonpublic
information in compliance with Regulation FD or obtain a confidentiality agreement
from those who receive the information.' The SEC has advised that if an issuer
selectively discloses information during an unregistered offering, with no agreement
concerning confidentiality, public disclosure is required under Regulation FD. 0
The dilemma this creates is that an issuer may lose a private placement exemption
under the Securities Act by making a public disclosure required under Regulation FD
if the disclosure is construed as a "general solicitation."'" Because the required
public disclosures could be construed as "general solicitation," ' 2 an issuer could lose
its exemption from registration by attempting to comply with Regulation FD. 3 The
SEC has made clear that issuers making unregistered offerings must consider the
impact their disclosures could have on the availability of the exemptions they use.'
Issuers must pay close attention to the effects selective disclosure may have on an
unregistered offering. 5
In operating within the new Regulation FD regime, issuers may deal with this
dilemma through the use of confidentiality agreements. 6 Issuers may avoid the
Regulation FD required public disclosure if those individuals who receive the
information agree to maintain it in confidence. 7 However, confidentiality
agreements are not the dominant market practice. It is impractical to obtain
confidentiality agreements in the context of private placements as many qualified
institutional buyers ("QIBs") will decline to be bound by such agreements. Rather,
it is likely that issuers will have to determine whether to limit the information
disseminated at private placement roadshows to that information which the issuer is
prepared to make public, or obtain confidentiality agreements (which is uncommon
in Rule 144A transactions) from those receiving the information."'
from Regulation FD. See supra text at Part II.B.
228. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. 230.502(c) (2000) (Regulation D prohibits "general
solicitation" in private placement under Rule 505 and Rule 506). In most cases, "general
solicitation" is prohibited in private placements of securities under the Securities Act. Issuers
making a "general solicitation" in the course of a private placement will negate the availability
of a Securities Act registration exemption. See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A; Regulation
S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.905 (2000).
232. See Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. 230.502(c).
233. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725.
234. Id. This is an area of concern for issuers planning to rely on unregistered offerings.
If the public disclosure required by Regulation PDjeopardizes the exemption from registration
under the Securities Act, the dilemma created could make private placements unworkable in
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Although it is in contravention of commercial practice, issuers may choose to
obtain express confidentiality agreements to comply with Regulation FD.9 It is not
a requirement of Regulation FD that these confidentiality agreements are in writing
(an express oral agreement will suffice), or obtainedpriorto making the disclosure."'
An agreement made after the disclosure is made gives the issuer an opportunity to
assess the materiality of the disclosure after the fact and attempt to cure the disclosure
before the recipient of the information discloses or trades on it."4 Nevertheless,
issuers that rely on confidentiality agreements as the basis for complying with
Regulation FD are advised to obtain written agreements. 4
The SEC provides that these written agreements should include a covenant to keep
the information confidential and a covenant requiring the recipient to abstain from
trading on the basis of the information.243 Investors or market professionals that enter
into confidentiality agreements with the issuer may be subject to the duty to disclose
or abstain from trading under Rule 1Ob-5." Pursuant to Rule 1Ob-5, the party subject
to the confidentiality agreement must either disclose the material information to the
public or abstain from trading while the information remains undisclosed.245 If the
investors or marketprofessionals breach this duty that is created by the confidentiality
agreement, they "place themselves at risk of illegal tipping and insider trading."'2
3. Short-Form Registration and Rule 144
Failure to comply with Regulation FD will not affect the issuer's ability to use
Forms S-2,147 S-3,245 S-8,249 or Rule 144 (eligibility for which is conditioned on the
239. Id. Any agreement to maintain confidentiality must be express. Id. at 51,720 n.28.
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. The existence of a written confidentiality agreement will provide hard evidence that
the issuer intended to disclose the information in confidence. In an Enforcement Division
investigation, a written agreement would more effectively show compliance with Regulation
FD than would an attempt at proving the existence of an express oral agreement.
243. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
244. Id.
245. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1980) (citing In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961)); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (citingIn re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907,912 (1961)); Selective
Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720, 51,725 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,243, and 249).
246. Walker, supra note 101, at 8. The new Rule 10b5-1 creates affirmative defenses from
insider trading liability; however, a discussion of this issue is beyond the breadth of this
Article. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1.
247. 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (2000). Form S-2 (used in short form registration) requires that
the issuer be current in filing its reports for a period of at least twelve months and in some
respects, at least thirty six months. Id. § 239.12(c)(1).
248. Id. § 239.13. Form S-3 (used in short form registration) requires that the issuer be
current in filing its reports for a period of at least twelve months. Id. § 239.13(a)(3).
249. Id. § 239.16(b). Form S-8 (used for securities offered under an employee benefit
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issuer having timely filed all Exchange Act reports)." The potential threat was that
a failure to file a Form 8-K under Regulation FD, when no other required public
disclosure was made, would destroy the availability of short-form registration and
render Rule 144 resales and Form S-8 employee benefit plan offerings unavailable."2
Regulation FD asserts that "an issuer's failure to comply with the regulation will not
affect whether the issuer is considered current or, where applicable, timely in its
Exchange Act reports for purposes of [sales under] Form S-8, short form registration
on Form S-2 or S-3, and [resales under] Rule 144." 3 The SEC has implemented this
approach recognizing that Regulation FD's application to the availability of short-
form registration, resales under Rule 144, and employee benefit plan offerings would
negatively affect the issuer's ability to raise capital and penalize shareholders and
employees of the company.' s
H. Liability Under Regulation FD
Enforcement of the new Regulation FD is limited to SEC actions; hence, there is
no private right of action solely for a violation of Regulation FD2 s5 The regulation
consists of issuer disclosure rules that create duties for public companies under
Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act (and for closed-end investment
companies, under Section 30 of the Investment Company Act).' Regulation FD is
not an antifraud rule, and it does not create any new duties under the existing
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws or any new private rights of
action.' Specifically, Regulation FD provides that "[n]o failure to make a public
disclosure required solely by [Rule 100 of Regulation FD] shall be deemed to be a
violation of Rule 10b-5 ... under the Securities Exchange Act."' 8 Therefore, private
plaintiffs cannot rely on a violation of Regulation FD as the legal basis for a private
cause of action.2"9
A violation of Regulation FD will subject the issuer to an SEC enforcement
plan) generally requires that the issuer be current in filing its reports for a period of at least
twelve months. Id.
250. Id. § 230.144. For resale to be valid, Rule 144 requires that the issuer has made all
required filings under the Exchange Act during the twelve preceding months. Id. §
230.144(c)(1).
251. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.103 (2000).
252. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,725 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249).
253. Id. at 51,726; see also 17 C.F.R. § 243.103.
254. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
255. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102; seealso Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 51,726.
256. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
257. Id. "[B]ecause a violation of Regulation FD is not an antifraud violation, it would
not lead to loss of the safe harbor for forward looking statements provided by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995." Id. at 51,726 n.85.
258. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102.
259. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
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action." The SEC could either "bring an administrative action seeking a cease-and-
desist order[] or a civil action seeking an injunction and/or civil money penalties.""26
Failure to furnish a Form 8-K ormake an alternative public disclosure required under
Regulation FD will be considered a violation for as long as the deficiency
continues. 2 The SEC states that in enforcement actions, it will seek more severe
sanctions for violations that progress for an extended period of time. Additionally,
the SEC maybring actions against the individual or individuals at the company who
were responsible for the violation."s In a cease-and-desist proceeding brought by the
SEC, the individual or individuals would be liable as "a cause of' the violation.2'
Should the SEC bring an injunctive action, the individual or individuals would be
liable as aiders and abetters of the violation.265
Issuers should closely note the SEC's mention that Regulation FD is designed to
exclude antifraud liability from actions that would be based "solely" on the failure to
make a required public disclosure under Regulation FD." The existing grounds for
antifraud liability under Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act. remain applicable to the
issuer's actions.2" Therefore, issuers remain at risk of "tipper" liability and insider
tradingif "selective disclosure is made incircumstances that meet the Dirks 'personal
benefit' test." 8 Byrequiringpublic disclosure of information, Regulation FD creates
additional exposure to liability under the antifraud provisions of federal securities
laws. For example, if any statements made by the issuer pursuant to Regulation FD
are found to be false or misleading, or inadequate because material information was
260. Id. The SEC has stated that they
are not looking to frustrate the purpose of the rule-which is to promote
broader and fairer disclosure of information to investors-by second-
guessing reasonable disclosure decisions made in good faith, even if we
don't agree with them. Nor are we looking to test the outer limits of the
rule by bringing cases that aggressively challenge the choices issuers are
entitled to make regarding the manner in which a disclosure is made.
There willbe no [Regulation] FD SWAT teams, and I do not envision any
[Regulation] FD sweeps, unless, of course, there is widespread
noncompliance with the rule ....
Walker, supra note 101, at 5.
261. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
262. Id. at 51,726 n.91.
263. Id. at 51,726.
264. Id.; see also Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1994).
265. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(e) (1994).
266. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
267. See id.
268. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 35-36. The Dirks "personal benefit" test
for insider trading liability is stated as follows: "Whether disclosure is a breach of duty...
depends in large part on the purpose of the disclosure... .Thus, the test is whether the insider




omitted, the issuer may be liable under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.269
An additional consideration for issuers is that public disclosure of material
information under Regulation FD may create a "duty to update" or a "duty to correct"
any statements released.70 Thus, any subsequent. statements released by an issuer
because of the duty to update or correct will not be protected by Regulation FD's
Rule 1Ob-5 safe harbor.27 Furthermore, in certain circumstances, an issuer's failure
to make a required public disclosure under Regulation FD may give rise to liability
under a duty to correct or update.2 2 As a cautionary matter, issuers that find
themselves having to make Regulation FD disclosures due to non-intentional selective
disclosures should take adequate measures so that, inscramblingto make the required
disclosure, they do not run afoul of Rule lob-5 of the Exchange Act. Although the
SEC establishes a safe harbor for disclosures required "solely" by Regulation FD, if
an issuer's public disclosure contains a material misrepresentation or if an issuer's
failure to make a public disclosure is an omission of material information, the safe
harbor will not provide protection from Rule lOb-5 liability.2'
Ill. THE EFFECTS ON WALL STREET AND MARKET PROFESSIONALS
To date, the early report card on Regulation FD displays mixed results.274
However, few will dispute that the SEC's new Regulation FD has directly impacted
the means by which market professionals operate.2' Some commentators have noted
that Regulation FD delivers a sharp blow to market professionals, while others are
optimistic about its impact. 6 Security analysts and institutional investors play an
269. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726. In the Regulation
FD adopting release, the SEC also adopts Rules lOb5-1 and lOb5-2 that codify some of the
aspects of current case law under Rule lob-5. A discussion of the impact of these new antifraud
rules is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally id. at 51,727-30.
270. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726; see also In re IBM
Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 109-110 (2d Cir. 1998) (addressing the distinction between
the duty to update and the duty to correct); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16-17,
21 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing the duty to update and correct). See generally Robert H.
Rosenblum, An Issuer's Duty Under Rule lob-5 to Correct and Update Materially Misleading
Statements, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 289,291-97 (1991).
271. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2000).
272. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726. Also, the SEC
states that "an issuer's contacts with analysts may lead to liability under the 'entanglement' or
'adoption' theories." Id.; see, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir.
1980).
273. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726.
274. Neal Lipschutz, Disclosure Rule's Early Mixed Report Card, Dow JONES NEWS
SERV., Jan. 19, 2001, available at http://www.ccbn.comfregulationfd/20010119.html.
275. See, e.g., Miriam Hill, New RuleAims to Keep Investors in the Know, But Wall Street
Analysts Wonder How it Will Affect Their Work, CIn. TRIB,, Nov. 21, 2000, at C3.
276. Id. One commentator stated that Regulation FD "didn't do anything but I drive a
stake [through] the heart of the analysts," while another optimistically stated "that the change
will not put him and other analysts out of work." Id.
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instrumental role in information networks, and understanding this role is necessary
in analyzing the impact of Regulation FD.
Sell-side analysts, who study a number of companies and industry groups, are
typically associatedwithbroker-dealer firms and investmentbanks.2" Most specialize
in a particular industry and use their financial expertise to provide heavily researched
investment information to customers and potential customers of their respective
firms2  This professional field is very competitive and a premium is placed on the
accuracy of information. 9 On a daily basis a sell-side analyst's functions consist of
1) ferreting out information concerning specific companies, 2) digesting and
analyzing the information, along with other information about the given industry and
the general economy, and 3) distributing the information.2 This investment
information is targeted to customers of the analyst's fin; however, with the vast
expansion of electronic financial news services, sell-side analysts' reports are rapidly
disseminated to the marketplace.2 1 Some sell-side analysts have a notable influence
on market participants and can affect the price of a company's stock when they issue
a report or recommendation.2
Buy-side analysts are typically associated with institutional investors,2 83 such as
mutual funds and pension funds.' These analysts perform the same daily functions
as the aforementioned sell-side analysts; however, buy-side analysts conduct research
and produce reports for the use of particular investors.2' Therefore, buy-side analyst
information is not widely disseminated in the same manner as sell-side analyst
information. Despite this fact, buy-side analysts and institutional investors play a
necessary role by providing a vehicle through which Main Street investors can
invest.' Specifically, Main Street investors entrust their money to institutional
investors due to their financial expertise, ability to obtain and evaluate information
(through buy-side analysts), and economic knowledge.287 Through these institutional
277. See Karen M. Kroll, Bridging the Earnings Divide, INDUSTRY WEEK, Oct. 2001, at
27, available at LEXIS, News Library, Indwk File.
278. See, e.g., id.
279. See Chad Bray & Phyllis Plitch, Wall Street Companies Run Into Conflicts Under
Reg FD, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Nov. 29, 2000, available at
http://www.ccbn.com/regulationfd/20011129.htnil.
280. See, e.g., id.
281. See id.
282. See A. Gary Shilling, Foul Disclosure, FORBES, Jan. 22, 2001, at 152.
283. Institutional investor is defined as follows: an "organization that trades large volumes
of securities. Some examples are mutual funds, banks, insurance companies, pension funds,
labor unions funds, corporate profit-sharing plans, and college endowment funds. Typically,
upwards of 70 % [sic] of the daily trading on the New York Stock Exchange is on behalf of
institutional investors."BARRON'SDICTIONARYOFFINANCE .ANDINVESTMENTTERMS 282 (5th
ed. 1998).
284. Karen M. Kroll, Talking with Wall Street, INDUSTRY WEEK, Nov. 16, 1998, at 68,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Indwk File.
285. See, e.g., id.




investment opportunities,288 Main Street investors benefit from the information flow
to buy-side analysts that produce investment recommendations. 9
Prior to Regulation FD, the information network between issuers and analysts
evolved into a specialized channel of communication. On October 23, 2000, the day
Regulation FD went into effect, this channel of communication was disjointed.2" In
the "old days," '29 the individuals on the Wall StreetJournal's list of all-star analysts
developed special skills for gently squeezing information out of the executives at the
companies they covered.' Building relationships through regular contact and
schmoozing with the company's executives facilitated getting information and getting
it first. 3 Additionally, by providing friendly reports, some analysts developed a quid
pro quo relationship with the companies they covered.' For example, an analyst
might slightly alter the tone of an earnings report to cast the issuer in a positive light;
therefore, when the company wanted to leak earnings information, that analyst would
gain apriorityposition over other analysts covering the issuer or the industry.29 Thus,
it was to an analyst's advantage to be polite when reporting negative information
rather than blasting the issuer or the executive officers. However, in light of
Regulation FD, many of the old school analyst tactics will fail to produce the same
proprietary corporate disclosure of information.
As previously established in Part II of this Article, Regulation FD was designed
to prevent public companies from releasing material information to market
professionals, such as analysts or institutional money managers, unless such
information is broadly disseminated.2' It is a near unanimous consensus that market
professionals feel that "Regulation FD has made theirjob more difficult."2' Analysts
288. Institutional investment opportunities provided to Main Street investors include such
financial products as mutual funds, commercial bank investment plans, insurance company
instruments, pension funds, labor unions funds, and investment based retirement plans.
289. Many commentators believe that security markets as a whole benefit from the
efficient and accurate pricing that occurs through the informed investment decisions of
institutional investors. It is the theory of security trading experts that well-informed
institutional investors and analysts decrease market volatility and increase liquidity. See
Lawrence E. Harris, Trading and Exchanges 9-1 to 9-8, 9-16 (Aug. 2, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Indiana Law Journal).
290. See, e.g., Bray & Plitch, supra note 279.
291. The "old days" refers to the time period before the October 23, 2000, effective date
of Regulation FD.
292. Hill, supra note 275.
293. Id.
294. Id.; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,717
(Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249).
295. Hill, supra note 275. As this competitive practice among analysts develops, an
incentive is created to release only positive reports about the company or risk losing this
priority position in the informational chain. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65
Fed. Reg. at 51,717.
296. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-. 103 (2000); see also Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718.
297. Bray & Plitch, supra note 279.
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are experiencing unreturned phone calls to corporate executives-calls that were
previouslyreturned within twenty-four hours.m RegulationFD is forcing Wall Street
professionals to rely less on relations with corporate executives and to do more leg
work in producing earnings estimates. One seasoned analyst has commented that
"[c]ompanies are currently unsure about how to act in this new environment, so
they're taking the safest course possible and revealing significantly less than ever
before."'" ° Previously, issuers would informally "review analyst estimates and
provide 'guidance' to keep their numbers from getting too far afield."' '3 This
provided security analysts with a more accurate picture of the financial condition of
the issuer when completing their research reports. Since this practice no longer
continues (within the confines of Regulation FD), analysts must adjust their practices
to formulate accurate reports and earnings estimates. This Part further analyzes the
role of Wall Street professionals and the positive and negative effects Regulation FD
has on their job performance.
A. Positive Effects
Few will argue that Regulation FD has not had an impact on Wall Street
professionals. Conversely, many will argue over the extent of that impact. One group
of commentators believes that Regulation FD positively affects analysts' job
performance because it encourages competition and it levels the playing field with
respect to access to information. 2 Now all analysts are on equal footing when
competing for access to material information. Under Regulation FD, Wall Street
professionals will be able to benefit from superior research and analytical skills
without worrying whether other analysts possess a competitive advantage because
they have been favored with selectively disclosed information.3" And, analysts are
now free to provide honest, forthright opinions, absent the fear of later being denied
access to selectively disclosed information."'
An analyst's primary job is to estimate corporate earnings. Because investors
scrutinize companies who miss earnings estimates, corporate management wants to
coach analysts in order to make sure estimates reflect actual earnings. On Wall Street,
this is called "guidance," but in actuality, it is financial executives (usually the CFO)
adjusting analysts' earnings estimates to match internal corporate earnings
projections."0 Working within the confines of Regulation FD, companies will no
298. Hill, supra note 275.
299. Lee Clifford, The SEC Wants to Open the Info Vault: Regulation FD Sounds Great
on Paper, But Will It Help Investors Know More About the Companies They Own?, FORTUNE,
Nov. 13, 2000, at 124.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,728; see also Hill, supra
note 275.
303. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,734; see also Levitt,
supra note 1, at 1-2.
304. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,734.
305. See Gregory Zuckerman, Cisco News Is No Friend to Market, but NASDAQ Index
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longer be able to offer "guidance" unless they publicly release it to everybody at
once.3  Some view this as a positive for the analyst profession, stating that there
"may be a return to good old-fashion research."3 7 In fact, this is exactly what is
happening as analysts are turning to more outside sources for corporate information
and financial figures.30 8 Analysts are finding themselves unable to get answers from
corporate executives and are therefore turning to corporate competitors, suppliers,
and customers for information."° In this new regulatory environment, analysts will
no longer be capable of gaining a competitive edge by cultivating a "you scratch my
back, I'll scratch yours" relationship with corporate executives.
As a practical matter, many Wall Street analysts (especially the publicly touted
"superstars") have been spending more time marketing corporate finance deals and
spending less time conducting serious company analysis. 0 On Wall Street, these
analysts have been likened to "investment banker[s] in analyst's clothing."' For
example, consider a "superstar" technology industry analyst working at a prestigious
Wall Street investment bank.312 In releasing his quarterly rankings for e-commerce
companies, it is not surprising to find that six out of the seven winners were clients
of the investment bank 3t 3 Equally predictable were the rankings of the twelve losers,
none of whom were clients of the investment banking firm.3 .4 Not surprisingly, this
analyst's ranking criteria are the exact same criteria the firm uses when selecting e-
commerce companies to underwrite.311 These "investment bankers in analyst's
clothing" do not diligently construct analytical models to estimate earnings; rather,
they rely on the corporate management of firm clients to feed them information.36 On
a positive note, Regulation FD works to muzzle these "cheerleading analysts" by
eliminating the selectively disclosed flow of information from corporate clients of the
investment banking firm. 317
The Wall Street professionals who will benefit from Regulation FD are the
independent analysts who produce unbiased opinions.3 ' Now that Regulation FD
Falls Only 2.13%, WALLST. J., Feb. 8, 2001, at C1.
306. Regulation FD, 17 CF.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2000). When an analyst calls a CFO for
guidance, he cannot give out any material information that would raise or lower estimates. Hill,
supra note 275. Also, he cannot even advise if he is comfortable with current estimates. Id.
307. Hill, supra note 275.
308. Id.
309. Id. Through these sources, analysts can get information and figures concerning sales,
customer satisfaction, and market share. Id.







317. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2000); see also Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,716-18 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249).
318. See Shilling, supra note 282.
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prohibits selective disclosure, all analysts will be provided access to information at
the same time.3 9 Independent, unbiased analysts who possess superior diligence and
acumen will rise to the top in the new Regulation FD environment. No longer will a
handful.ofanalysts have a priorityposition in receiving selectively disclosed material
information from corporate management.32o
Institutional investors and well-seasoned individual investors are fully aware ofthe
biases of Wall Street analysts-specifically big investment banking firms'
"cheerleading analysts"--and rely on these analysts solely as a pipeline to corporate
information while conducting much of the detailed analysis themselves. 2 Now that
Regulation FD makes the release of material corporate information publicly available
at the same time, institutional investors may shift their reliance away from
"cheerleading analysts" and on to diligent independent analysts.3" Through the
implementation of Regulation FD, the SEC has created an atmosphere in which
analysts have equal access to information and are free to express their opinions
without fear of later being denied access to material corporate information."3 This
competitive paradigm allows market professionals who use their education, personal
judgment, and expertise in analyzing financial data to flourish by placing all
participants on equal footing with respect to access to information.324
B. Negative Effects
InDirks, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that "the role of market analysts
... is necessary to the preservation of healthy markets."325 Moreover, the Court
provided that
[i]t is commonplace for analysts to "ferret out and analyze information,"...
and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and
others who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain normally
may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation's
securities.... It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the
markets themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously
available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the public generally.326
In the past, it was an unquestioned assumption that securities analysts play an
important intermediary role between the issuers and the investors.37 However, in a
319. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103.
320. See id.
321. Shilling, supra note 282.
322. Id.
323. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,731 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249).
324. Id.
325. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).
326. Id. at 658-59 (emphasis added) (partiallydrawing fromthe position taken bythe SEC
in previous Commission actions).
327. Id.; see also In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 646 (1971).
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recent speech, former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated that "he didn't think
investors need analysts to interpret news.., from a company."3" The argument has
surfaced that Main Street investors no longer expect to rely on research performed
by analysts.3" In light of the advances in information technology and the use of the
Internet, real-time corporate information can be released to the public without the use
of analysts as intermediaries.33 The adoption of Regulation FD is in response to
concerns that the analyst's role in the market is increasingly becoming that of a
gatekeeper of selectively disclosed information rather than a necessary participant.33'
Due to the rise of disintermediation (investors shifting reliance from analysts to
nontraditional intermediaries such as the Internet), the role of the analyst is
significantly changing.33" Supporting the position that Regulation FD has a negative
impact on Wall Street analysts, SEC Acting Chairman Laura Unger (appointed as
Acting Chairman on February 12, 2001) stated that "Regulation FD turns on its head
the longstanding relationship between issuers and analysts."333
The SEC noted in the 1998 Aircraft Carrier Release that analysts "digest
information.. ., put all of it into context, and act as conduits in the flow of
information by publishing reports explaining the effects of this information to
investors."334 However, under Regulation FD, issuers will disseminate material
information to the marketplace as a whole, significantly cutting out the analyst's role
as the intermediary who ferrets out and analyzes information prior to broad
328. Randall Smith, Bids and Offers: Special Report from the Annual Wall Street
Convention in Boca Raton, Fl., WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2000, at C16. This statement was made
by Chairman Levitt at the annual meeting of the Security Industry Association at the Boca
Raton Resort & Club in Palm Beach, Florida. Id. In another speech Chairman Levitt stated that
"America's investors don't need interpreters." Hon. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks
on "Wall Street Week with Louis Rukeyser" (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 3, 2000) (on file
with Indiana Law Journal).
329. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715,51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 240,243, and 243).
330. Id.
331. Id.; see also Susan Pulliam, Abercrombie & Fitch Ignites Controversy Over Possible
Leak of Sluggish Sales Data, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1999, at Cl; Susan Pulliam & Gary
McWilliams, Compaq Is Criticized for How It Disclosed PC Troubles, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2,
1999, at ClI.
332. See Susan Scherreik, The SquawkBox GoesPublic: Companies Open Up Their Wall
Street Chats, Bus. WL., Feb. 5,2001, at 118. Specifically, because investors now have access
to a great deal ofreal-time corporate information through Intemet Web pages, conference calls,
and webcasting, analysts are no longer the only possible intermediaries for accessing corporate
information. Id.; see also Sue Zeidler, Webcasters Gear Up for Earnings Under New SEC
Rule, REUTERS ENGLISH NEWS SERV., Dec. 27, 2000, available at
http://www.ccbn.com/regulationfd/20001227.html.
333. SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Address at the Glasser Legal Works Conference
on SEC Regulation FD (Oct. 27, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch421 .htn
[hereinafter Unger].
334. The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-7607A, 63
Fed. Reg. 67,174 (Dec. 4, 1998).
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dissemination." 5 Regulation FD is making analysts' jobs much more difficult.
Initially, most corporate executives have responded to Regulation FD by refusing to
return phone calls or speak privately with analysts.3  Conversely, executives are
publicly releasing much more unimportant information-which analysts must ferret
through-in fear ofbreachingRegulation FD.33 7Although the SEC has provided that
there will be no "FD Swat teams," or "FD sweeps,"338 corporate executives do not
want to be made examples of by initial enforcement action and are therefore
remaining tight-lipped.33 9
Corporate executives' tight-lipped response to Regulation FD has contributed to
the decline in the accuracy of analysts' estimates.3" In the past, analysts' earnings
estimates clustered in a tight range."M Following the adoption of Regulation FD,
however, the standard deviation342 of analysts' estimates increased considerably. 43
Analysts claim that issuers are giving less earnings guidance than before the
implementation of Regulation FD, and thus the accuracy of estimates is likely to
vary.' " A seasoned analyst at one reputable institution stated that before Regulation
FD was introduced, "[cooperative executives would] give you sales estimates, credit
[status], [and] gross-margin trends... [b]ut that's no longer the case. ' s While
issuers are declining to provide on-the-spot guidance, the matter is further
complicated by corporate executives publicly releasing large amounts of unimportant
information that analysts must sort through and decipher.3"
For a specific example of Regulation FD's negative impact on the accuracy of
analysts' estimates, examine the case of Cisco Systems' ("Cisco") fourth quarter
335. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2000).
336. Allison Bisbey Colter, Fund Firms Strengthen Research Teams, WALL ST. J., Jan.
2, 2001, at C19; see also Hill, supra note 275; Robert McGough & Cassell Bryan-Low,
Analysts' Earnings Estimates Are Diverging, and SEC Disclosure Rule May Why, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 2, 2000, at C2.
337. Colter, supra note 336.
338. Walker, supra note 101.
339. Bray & Plitch, supra note 279; see also Phyllis Plitch, SECDisclosure Rule Prompts
Varied Corporate Spins, Dow JONES NEWS SERV., Nov. 16, 2000, available at
http://www.ccbn.com/regulationfd/2001116.html.
340. McGough & Bryan-Low, supra note 336. According to a study by BulldogResearch,
a firm that tracks analysts relative performance on estimates and recommendations, analysts'
accuracy has decreased by 5.3 percent since the adoption of Regulation FD. Id.
341. Id.
342. The standard deviation is a statistical measure of the distance between analysts'
estimated earnings and the analysts' average estimated earnings. Id.
343. Id. ("BulldogResearch found that the 'flash estimates' for companies-that is,
estimates that were changed by analysts in the four weeks before earnings were




346. Colter, supra note 336.
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earnings disappointment in 2000."4 Cisco's sustained growth had made it one of the
surest bets on Wall Street and allowed for near perfect analyst estimates. 8 In fact,
until the fourth quarter of the year 2000, Cisco had met or slightly exceeded analysts'
earnings expectations for almost seven straight years." 9 Unfortunately, when Cisco
reported their fourth quarter earnings, they fell short of the consensus of analysts'
estimates." For the first time in nearly seven years, analysts inaccurately estimated
Cisco's earnings.
Part of the reason for the analysts' inaccuracy can be attributed to the new
Regulation FD regime. Cisco's stellar track record for meeting analysts' expectations
can be partially attributed to Cisco executives providing regular earnings guidance to
analysts, a process that has been smothered with the advent of Regulation D.35
Analysts are not only receiving less material information, they are waiting longer
to receive information they seek." Instead of directly calling a specific corporate
executive to get sales estimates or earnings information, analysts listen in on
conference calls and wait their turn to ask a question of management."3 This new
process "has become excruciatingly painful."" Analysts will listen to conference
calls for two, three, and four hours sifting through corporate minutiae, looking for
information they need and waiting to ask questions.355 For Wall Street professionals,
the widely accessed conference calls are rapidly becoming a major frustration.
In the past, analysts coped with same-day conference calls; however, the calls ran
shorter because fewer analysts had access, and there were not as many basic issues
discussed." Previously, analysts would ask the less-relevant, basic questions in
private phone conversations later with corporate management.3"' Yet under the
current Regulation FD disclosure scheme, company management is prevented from
offering new material information in such private phone conversations."' Instead of
347. See Zuckerman, supra note 305.
348. Id.
349. Id. Part of the reason for Cisco's performance in meeting or exceeding analysts'
expectations can be attributed to "browbeat[ing]" one-on-one phone calls between analysts and
company executives. Because back-channel "browbeating" is no longer an option under
Regulation FD, companies such as Cisco will no longer be able to "walk down the Street" in
the same manner. See Adam Lashinsky, Reg FD Works: Nortel Provides Evidence (Nov. 2,
2000), at http://www.thestreet.com/comment/siliconstreet1i 153533.html.
350. Zuckerman, supra note 305.
351. Id. The impact of this case will be further examined with respect to individual
investors in Part IV.B. of this Article.
352. Jeff D. Opdyke & Emily Nelson, Conference-Call Crunch: New SEC Rule Turns





357. Id. See McGough & Bryan-Low, supra note 336.
358. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) (2000); Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 240,
243, and 249).
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one forty-five minute conference call discussing big strategic questions and market-
moving information, analysts are spending half of the day listening in on less relevant
information. 5 9
The daily operations of an accomplished Silicon Valley equity analyst depicts the
microeffect of Regulation FD on market professionals. Arriving at his office in
downtown San Francisco, the analyst prepares to listen in on earnings conference
calls from5:30 A.M. until 12:15 P.M.360 The daybefore, the analyst and two associates
developed a plan for covering six conference calls that are likely to overlap.36'
Ultimately, the calls do overlap and the analyst and his two associates scramble to
cover all six calls, making snap judgments as to "which one is more important. '3 On
one conference call, the company's CEO jokingly remarks that there were fifteen
people in the room advising him on what to say.363 After seven hours of listening in
on conference calls, and several hours of drafting research reports and phoning
clients, the analyst's day under the Regulation FD regime is over. ' Approximately
six hours later it will start again. The following is a day in the life of the analyst under
Regulation FD:
- 3:30 A.M. Crawls out of bed at home in Novato, Calif[omia]. Leaves home
at 4:10 AM. to drive about 35 miles to San Francisco.
- 4:55 A.M. Morning meeting, reiterates strong buy on Kimberly-Clark.
- 5:30 A.M.- 6:30 A.M. Tupperware conference call. While on the call, also
fields calls from clients and Banc of America salespeople. Disconnects early
for the next call.
-6 A.M. Estee Lauder conference call .... disconnects early but his associate
stays on.
- 7 A.M. Kimberly-Clark conference call. Disconnects early but another
associate stays on.
- 8 A.M. Colgate-Palmolive conference call.
- 9:15 A.M. - 10 A.M. Calls clients and salespeople and confers with
associates to swap details from the parts of calls each missed.
- 10 A.M. Dial conference call.
I I A.M. - 12:15 P.M. Newell conference call.
1 P.M. Walks to the deli across the street for a sandwich to eat at his desk.
- Afternoon. Calls clients. Revises earnings models, confers with associates
about reports he'll e-mail to clients the next morning.
- 6:30 P.M. Finishes all five reports.
-7 P.M. Records a 'blast voice mail,' a message to about 350 clients.
-7:15 P.M. Leaves the office.
-8 P.M. Has dinner with his wife. . . , reads a few reports on the companies
359. Opdyke & Nelson, supra note 352; see also Unger, supra note 333.







that will report earnings the next day.365
Proponents of Regulation FD "argue that analysts will just have to work harder on
researching their reports."3' There is no doubt that analysts' workloads will increase.
The days of informal calls to the CFO seeking financial data and earnings guidance
have come to a screeching halt under Regulation FD.3" Corporate executives are
refusing to talk to analysts privately and instead are releasing a lot of unimportant
information via publicly accessible conference calls and webcasts." 8
Analysts no longer have the time to research alternative methods of valuing
companies; instead, they are under increasing pressure to spend inordinate amounts
of time listening in on corporate conference calls and webcasts. 69 In response to the
new regulatory environment, research studies have shown the accuracy of analysts'
estimates are decreasing and the ranges are increasing.37 Summarizing the impact of
Regulation FD on market professionals, one commentator offered that RegulationFD
does nothing but "drive a stake in the heart of the analyst."37
IV. THE EFFECTS ON MAIN STREET AND THE ORDINARY INVESTOR
The bull market" 2 run of the 1990s has been one of the longest and most dramatic
growth phases in the history of the stock market.373 This great bull market, which
began in August 1982, has provided returns that are approximately twice the
historical average.374 Extraordinary returns earned by Main Street investors have
raised expectations to levels that are far beyond what equities have earned in the past
and beyond what they are likely to earn in the future.375 The influx of Main Street
investors has basked in prosperity due to the great advances in market averages.376
An examination of the historical returns of the stock market, for the period from
365. Id.
366. Unger, supra note 333.
367. Hill, supra note 275; see also Colter supra note 336.
368. Id.; see also Opdyke & Nelson, supra note 352.
369. Colter, supra note 336.
370. See McGough & Bryan-Low, supra note 336. The BulldogResearch study found that
the actual accuracy of analysts' estimates decreased 5.3 percent, and the range of estimates has
grown more dispersed by 13.67 percent. Id.
371. Hill, supra note 275.
372. Bull market is defined as a "prolonged rise in the prices of stocks, bonds, or
commodities." BARRON'SDICTiONARYOFFNANCE AND INVESTMBNTTERMS 69 (5th ed. 1998).
"Bull markets usually last at least a few months and are characterized by high trading volume."
Id.
373. Gabrielle Gutierrez& Guy Moszkowski, CFA, Trading Up: The Equity Markets and
the New World of Electronic Trading, EQUITY RESEARCH: UNITED STATES
(SalomonSmithBarney), Oct. 5, 1999, at 5.
374. Jeremy J. Siegel, Managing Your Expectationsfor Long-Term Success in the Stock
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1802 through 1998, reveals that the compounded annual return was 8.5 percent."
During the modem financial era, from 1926 to 1998, the total annual compound
return was 10.7 percent.378 Taking into consideration the depression-era stock market
of the 1930's, and looking at just the period following World War H (1946 to 1998),
the total return was 12.3 percent.3 Most recently, in a string of three consecutive
years-1995 to 1997-the Dow Jones Industrial Average ("DJIA") 38" recorded gains
of 36.9 percent, 28.9 percent, and 24.9 percent, respectively.3 1 And, in 1998 the
DJIA rose another 18.1 percent?3 Due to this performance, American equity markets
now serve "as the foundation and engine for individual [investor] savings and wealth
creation." '3
Individual stock ownership in the United States has increased dramatically
throughout the 1990s.3" The number of individual investors holding equities either
directly, through mutual funds, through supplemental retirement accounts, or through
defined contribution plans continues to increase.38' Currently, 51.8 percent of all
individuals who are household heads, or spouses of household heads, own stock.38
This is the first time-since statistical information concerning individual investor
trends has been recorded-that this proportion of shareownership exceeds 50
percent. 37 The number of Main Street shareholders increased by approximately 15
million between 1995 and 1998.3" At the end of 1998, 33.8 million individual
investors owned stock directly, 26.8 million owned stock through an equity mutual
fund, 33.9 million owned stock through a self-directed retirement account, and 48.3
377. Id. Economist and Professor of Finance, Jeremy Siegel, calculated these figures from
information gathered in a study of stock returns since 1802. See id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. The Dow Jones Industrial Average is a"price-weighted average of 30 actively traded
[blue chip] stocks, primarily industrials like Alcoa, General Motors, and IBM but including
American Express, Coca-Cola, McDonald's, . .. , Walt Disney and other service-oriented
firms. Prepared and published by Dow Jones & Co., it is the oldest and most widely quoted of
all the market indicators." BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 595
(5th ed. 1998).
381. Siegel, supra note 374.
382. Id.
383. Letter fromRichardA. Grasso, Chairman, New York Stock Exchange, to the publip
(Feb. 14., 2001), at http://nyse.com/marketinfo/chairmanletter.htn-l.
384. See New York Stock Exchange, Shareownership in the Late 1990s: Evidence From
the Survey of Consumer Finances, available at http://nyse.con-/marketinfo/studyl.html ("The
Survey of Consumer Finances ["SCF' is an ongoing survey conducted by the Survey Research
Center at the University of Michigan on behalf of the Federal Reserve Board.").
385. Id. The SCF shows that there were 84.0 million individual shareowners in 1998.
"This represents a 21% increase from 69.3 million in 1995 and, a 61% increase from 52.3






million owned stock through a defined contribution plan.389 In sum, the last decade
has provided for the most substantial expansion of shareholder population in market
history-a trend that is likely to extend into the foreseeable future.3"
The dramatic increase in the number of individual investors has led to the
contention that "Wall Street and Main Street [have become] one in the same."391 With
the insurgence of Main Street market participants and the high-growth bull market
environment, in 1994 through 1998, "the average annual share volume growth on the
NASDAQ and NYSE was 28 percent and 23 percent, respectively."3 ' Online and
discount brokers have provided individual investors quick and cost-effective means
of accessing equitymarkets. The average retail broker commission in 1994 was about
$280 per trade.393 In 1999, the average retail broker commission was less than $70,
with the deepest discounts offered by online services reaching as low as $7 per
trade .3 1 Competition among broker-dealers and the growth of online brokers have
389. Id. According to the SCF:
The "grand total" number of individuals who own stock is less than the
sum of the number who own stock in each way. For example, while 33.8
million individuals own stock directly and 26.8 million own stock through
equity mutual funds held outside retirement plans, the total number of
stockholders who owned stock either directly or through equity mutual
funds was 48.5 million .... This total reflects the fact that of the 26.8
million equitymutual fund owners, 12.1 million also owned stock directly.
The total number ofshareholders owning stock in either way was therefore
33.8 + 26.8 - 12.1 = 48.5 million.
The incremental number of shareowners who own stock through self-
directed retirement plans... is 27.3 million, even though 39.9 million
owned equity through some form of self-directed retirement plan. This
reflects the overlap of 6.6 million individuals who owned stock through
a self-directed retirement plan and also held stock directly, or through an
equity mutual fund, or through both of these alternative channels.
Finally, the incremental number of individuals who own stock through
a defined contribution retirement plan .... is 8.2 million. This incremental
value is low, even though 48.3 million individuals held some equity
through defined contribution plans, because of the substantial overlap
between those who hold equity through this channel and through the other
channels considered ....
Id.
390. Id. The following four factors suggest that the recent market growth will continue for
the foreseeable future: (1) the increase in the availability of self-directed retirement accounts;
(2) the rapid growth in the number of equity mutual funds; (3) stock options are becoming
increasingly common in compensation packages; and (4) the aging and increasing life span
expectancies of the U.S. population. Id.
391. Grasso, supra note 383 ('Today, half ofall shareholders have annual familyincomes
of less than $57,000.").
392. Gutierrez & Moszkowski, supra note 373, at 5.
393. Id. at 6.
394. Id.
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made it cheaper for increasing numbers of Main Street investors to take on Wall
Street. Moreover, the SEC's new Regulation FD has leveled the playing field further
by granting Main Street access to material corporate information on an equal footing
with Wall Street.3 95
But, is the adoption ofRegulation FD a positive or negative change forMain Street
investors? Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt was the driving force against the
practice of selective disclosure." His sustained crusade to implementRegulation FD
was prompted by a number of press reports released between 1995 and 1999."9
Levitt's victory has granted Main Street the right to access corporate information at
the same time as Wall Street.39 The initiative of Regulation FD is to democratize the
investment process and include Main Street while eliminating the situations where
Wall Street wields the power of information.3
The SEC's preoccupation with Main Street is evidenced by Levitt's opening
comments the day Regulation FD was adopted:
High quality and timely information is the lifeblood of strong, vibrant markets.
It is at the core of investor confidence. But when that information is used to
profit at the expense of the investing public, when that information comes by
way of favored access rather than by acumen, insight, or diligence, we must
ask, "Whose interest is really being served?' "
Acknowledging that every investor should be provided access to the same
information in order to maintain equitable markets, the query remains whether
Regulation FD is the most efficient mechanism to achieve such objectives.
A. Positive Effects
During the SEC's comment period for Regulation FD, many Main Street
"investors expressed frustration with the practice of selective disclosure, believing
that it place[d] them at a disadvantage in the market."" Other comments provided
that today's individual investor does not rely solely on research and analysis
395. SeeRegulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2000); seealso Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715,51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 243, and 249).
396. Michael Schroeder & Randall Smith, Disclosure Rule Cleared by the SEC, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 11, 2000, at Cl.
397. Id.; see also Pulliam, supra note 331; Pulliam & McWilliams, supra note 331;
Randall Smith, Conference Calls to Big Investors Often Leave Little Guys Hiong Up, WALLST.
J., June 21, 1995, at Cl.
398. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-103; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716.
399. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716; see also Levitt,
supra note 1.
400. Levitt, supra note 1 (emphasis in original). "[I]nvestor interests have conditioned
every decision made by this Commission since 1993." Id.
401. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717.
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performed by Wall Street professionals as was common in the past. 2 Clearly, with
the progression in information technology, specifically the Internet, individual
investors have greater access to corporate information than ever before. 3 The
explosion of popularity in the stock market has increased the demand and expectation
for the direct delivery of information to Main Street.' With the adoption of
Regulation FD, individual investors have won access to the release of material
corporate information at the same time that Wall Street professionals gain access.'
The impact on Main Street is positive in that all investors-no matter how big or
small-have access to the same material information at the same time, thereby
leveling the "battlefield."'
It is the SEC's position that Regulation FD will benefit individual investors by
providing fairness in securities markets as a whole." 7 The practice of selective
disclosure, in itself, damages investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of
securities markets. 8 "When selective disclosure leads to trading by the recipients of
the disclosure or trading by those whom these recipients advise, the practice bears a
close resemblance to ordinary 'tipping' and insider trading."' The economic impact
of insider trading and selective disclosure is essentially one and the same.410 In both
practices, a select group gains an informational advantage and subsequently uses that
advantage to profit at the expense and detriment of the uninformed.4 ' A recent study
found evidence that private analyst conference calls (also referred to as one-on-ones)
with issuers were directly associated with increased return volatility, trading volume,
402. Id. at 51,717 n.10.
403. With the revolutionary gain in popularity the stock market has realized, individual
investors have been bombarded with twenty-four hour television news programs, media
commercials and print advertisements, and online Web sites, all of which educate investors and
facilitate market investments. Id.
404. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717.
405. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-. 103 (2000); see also Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715.
406. See Smith, supra note 328. Specifically, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has stated that
"he didn't think investors need analysts to interpret news such as earnings 'guidance' from a
company." Id.
407. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,731.
408. Id. The most often referenced example of disclosure is that ofAbercrombie & Fitch
("A&F"). In October of 1999, a high ranking executive officer at A&F allegedly informed an
analyst at Lazard Freres (one of A&F's underwriters in its 1996 Initial Public Offering), that
third-quarter sales figures were going to be lower than expected. Over the next three days
Lazard Freres allegedly informed clients of the sales figures and advised them to sell their
shares in A&F. During that time the stock price fell 15% and A&F did not report the news.
Five days later A&F issued a press release highlighting the shortfall in sales figures. See
Pulliam, supra note 331, at Cl.
409.Id. Seegenerally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,649-66 (1997) (presenting
the misappropriation theory of insider trading); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655-64 (1983)
(presenting the "tipping" theory of insider trading).
410. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,73 1.
411. Id.
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and trade size."2 These results have been interpreted to suggest that material
information was provided in analyst conference calls and that large investors likely
took advantage of the selectively disclosed information.4t3 Therefore, it is plausible
that individual investors equate selective disclosure with insider trading and thus
question the integrity and fairness of the markets.4 4
The specific harm to individual investors resulting from selective disclosure is
highlighted in empirical studies that have shown that transaction costs increase when
select market participants possess material nonpublic information.4 5 In response,
however, Regulation FD works to diminish selective disclosure and benefit individual
investors through reducing trading costs." 6 Further market studies have shown that
insider trading and selective disclosure reduce liquidity4"7 and increase volatility'" to
the detriment of uninformed traders.4 t' The SEC is cognizant of the preceding
detrimental effects that selective disclosure may have on individual investors and has
412. Richard Frankel et a]., An Empirical Examination of Conference Calls As a
Voluntary Disclosure Medium, 37 J. ACCT. RES. 133, 143-55 (1999).
413. Id. at 154-66. Other commentators have disputed the reliability of the assumptions
in this study; however, the SEC believes the assumptions are reasonable. Selective Disclosure
and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,731 n.144.
414. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716.
415. Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with HeterogeneouslyInformed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985); see also
Itzhak Krinsky & Jason Lee, Earnings Announcements and the Components of the Bid-Ask
Spread, 51 J. FIN. 1523, 1524-27 (1996); Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider
Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315, 1316 (1985); Charles M.C. Lee et al., Spreads, Depths and
the Impact of Earnings Information: An Intraday Analysis, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 345, 353-55
(1993).
416. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 5 1,731.
417. With respect to securities markets, liquidity is defined as the:
ability to buy or sell an asset quickly and in large volume without
substantially affecting the asset's price. Shares in large blue-chip stocks
like General Motors or General Electric are liquid, because they are
actively traded and therefore the stock price will not be dramatically
moved by a few buy or sell orders. However, shares in smaller companies
with few shares outstanding, or commodity markets with limited activity,
generally are not considered liquid, because one or two big orders can,
move the price up'or down sharply. A high level of liquidity is a key
characteristic of a good market for a security or a commodity.
BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 329 (5th ed. 1998).
418. With respect to securities markets, volatility is defined as a "characteristic of a
security, commodity, or market to rise or fall sharply in price within a short-term period."
BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 691 (5th ed. 1998).
419. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency
ofStockPrices, 23 RANDJ. ECoN. 106, 107-18 (1992); see also Kyle, supra note 415, at 1315-
17: Michael Manove, The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation, 104 Q. J.
ECON. 823, 828-35 (1989).
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provided Regulation FD in retort.42 The intention of Regulation FD is to positively
benefit Main Street investors by curtailing the practice of selective disclosure-
thereby increasing liquidity, reducing volatility, and reducing the overall cost of
trading.
421
It is the view of the SEC, the Supreme Court, and Congress that individual
investors will lose confidence in the integrity of securities markets that they believe
are unfairly rigged against them.41 The loss in confidence, therefore, is likely to hurt
the market performance due to individual investors' unwillingness to infuse capital
into a corrupt system. If these investors believe the market to be systematically
populated with participants trading on the basis of selectively disclosed information,
a percentage of individual investors will refrain from trading to avoid informational
disadvantages.4  Thus it appears that the practice of selective disclosure damages
investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the markets and subsequently
injures Main Street investors by creating an inequitable atmosphere that discourages
investment 4
2 4
Regulation FD embodies the philosophy that securities markets, to be efficient,
must be free and democratic. Rather than a trickle-down approach from issuers to
analysts to Main Street, Regulation FD attempts to eliminate the informational
advantage Wall Street professionals have over individual investors.4 With the
emergence and progression of online investing through the use of such mechanisms
as Alternative Trading Systems ("ATSs")4' and the Small Order Execution System
420. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-. 103 (2000); see also Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,731; Levitt, supra note 1.
421. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,73 1.
422. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1997); see also Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716-17; H.R. REP. No. 100-910 at 8 (1988),
reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043,6045 ("The investing public has alegitimate expectation
that the prices of actively traded securities reflect publicly available information about the
issuer of such securities .... [T]he small investor will be-and has been-reluctant to invest
in the market if he feels it is rigged against him."); see also Victor Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 322, 355-57 (1979).
423. See Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for
Trading in Nonpublic Information, 13 HoFsTRA L. REv. 101, 121-24 (1984).
424. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. it 51,716-17, 51,731.
425. Id. at 51,716; Molly Williams & Robert McGough, New Disclosure Rules Mean
More LegworkAheadfor Analysts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2000, at Cl.
426. ATSs, which include Electronic Communication Networks ("ECNs"), can be defined
as "quasi-stock exchanges that electronically match orders and provide low-cost and fast
executions." Gutierrez & Moszkowski, supra note 373, at 3. "Established [ECNs] such as
Instinet and POSIT have been around for years, but new systems have recently emerged with
the rise in trade volumes, new technological advancements, and favorable SEC regulations
promoting exchange modernization." Id.; see also NSDA Rule Making: SuperMontage Release
No. 34-43863, 66 Fed. Reg. 8020 (Jan. 26, 2001); see also Alex Frew McMillan, SEC OKs
SuperMontage: Approve NASDAQ Plan to DisplayBestBuy and Sell Orders, IncludingPrices
from ECNs, CNNFN, Jan. 10, 2001, at
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("SOES")' 2 7 individual investors are increasingly utilizing direct access to the
markets.4' The contention is that today's individual investor-who utilizes the
increasing number of resources provided for making and executing investment
decisions- is a more educated investor.429 Accordingly, Regulation FD recognizes
the advancement in individual investors' acumen and operates to eliminate
information gatekeepers who simplyregurgitate information that has been selectively
disclosed to them.43
Presentedwith the similarities between selective disclosure and insider trading, the
SEC believes that Regulation FD will provide individual investors benefits that are
similar to those provided by insider trading regulations.4 Regulation FD is designed
to promote fair disclosure of information to all investors, and increase Main Street's
confidence in market integrity.432 By enhancing investor confidence in securities
markets, Regulation FD will encourage widespread individual investor participation,
enhance market efficiency, increase liquidity, and decrease volatility.433 The SEC has
"bet the store!" that Regulation FD will work to benefit Main Street investors by
placing them on equal footing with Wall Street professionals with respect to access
of material corporate information. 43
http://money.cnn.conV2001/01/10/investing/wires/superwgt.
427. SOES is defined as the "computerized Small OrderEntry (or Execution) System used
by NASDAQ, in which orders for under 1000 shares bypass brokers and are aggregated and
executed against available firm quotes by market makers on the NASDAQ system." BARRON'S
DICTIONARY OFFINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 574 (5th ed. 1998) (emphasis in original).
428. HARVEY 1. HOUTKIN & DAVID WALDMAN, SECRETS OF THE SOES BANDIT: THE
ORIGINAL ELECTRONIc TRADER REVEALS HIS BATTLE-TESTED TRADING TECHNIQUES 1-10
(1998).
429. See id. Attitudes towards the financial markets have changed in the recent past.
Individual investors used to rely heavily on financial professionals as intermediaries when
making investment decisions. Today, through the barrage of stock market propaganda, there
is a festering attitude that "housewives and truck drivers" can compete with Wall Street
professionals. See id. at 1-24. Currently, there are even individual investors paying $5,000
apiece to take a four-week trader training course. "The trend is your friend. Trade with your
head, not with your heart. Don't chase stocks." These are the catch phrases that are being
spewed to educate individual investors in preparation for competition with Wall Street
professionals at firms like Merrill Lynch. Alex FrewMcMillan, Hat It Takes to Trade: At All-
Tech, It's Money, and the Feeling You're Smarter than the Rest, CNNFN, Sept. 1, 1999, at
http://money.cnn.com/1999/09/01investingdaytrade..class.
430. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,717.
431. Id. at 51,731.
432. Id. at 51,716-17, 51,731; see also Levitt, supra note 1.
433. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,731.
434. Unger, supra note 333.
435. Id.; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716-17;





Although the SEC has "bet the store" that Regulation FD will work, Acting
Chairman Laura Unger has "bet her house" '436 that it will not43, 7 The SEC intends
Regulation FD to benefit individual investors by limiting the practice of selective
disclosure and creating a level playing field. 3 However, it is possible that the
negative impact of Regulation FD will offset the positive effects that individual
investors perceive.3 9 In analyzing the efficiency of securities markets, the
fundamental concept of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis ("ECMH")4 °
provides that securities traded in primary markets absorb-and reflect in their
prices-new information with great speed and accuracy.44 Applying the ECMH, it
is plausible to conclude that Regulation FD creates a fagade of market efficiency and
integrity while in effect it works against individual investors' best interests.
The most frequently referenced concern is that Regulation FD will have a chilling
effect on the disclosure of information by issuers."2 The practical problem arises
because issuers are unable to determine when information is subject to Regulation FD
and thus they scale back their disclosure." 3 Rather than makingjudgment calls about
whether the disclosure of information would be material,4 an issuer is more likely
to withhold the information in order to avoid potential liability." 5 Moreover,
companies that do not wish to talk with analysts can use Regulation FD as a means
to delay the release of information.4' The chilling effect that Regulation FD has on
436. Unger, supra note 333.
437. Id.
438. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716-17.
439. See id. at 51,716-18; see also Unger, supra note 333.
440. The ECMH is a widely debated theory that security prices in primary markets reflect
all available information about a given security with such speed that even sophisticated
investors cannot profit from trading on newly available information. The ECMH holds that
security prices in primary markets fully reflect all available information. Specifically, "prices
act as ifeveryone knows the information." William H. Beaver, Market Efficiency, 56 ACCT.
REV. 23, 35 (1981) (emphasis in original); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,246
(1988); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 550-55 (1989); Marvin G. Pickholz & Edward B. Horahan, The SEC's
Version ofthe Efficient Market Theory and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 943, 947-49 (1982).
441. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information,
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770-72 (1985).
442. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718; see also Judith
Bums, Impact of SEC Fair Disclosure Rule Still Debated, Dow JoNES NEWS SERV., January
25, 2001, available at http://www.ccbn.com/regulationfd/20010125.html.
443. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718.
444. Under Regulation FD, the issuer will have to make the determination whether a piece
of information is material and therefore subject to the regulation. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §
243.100 (2001).
445. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718.
446. Unger, supra note 333.
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issuers negatively impacts Main Street because less absolute disclosure makes for
fewer informed investment decisions.' 7 If Regulation FD limits the practice of
selective disclosure, but in so doing makes all investors less knowledgeable about
companies' performance, it will not create fairer, more efficient markets.
In examining the early impact of Regulation FD in regard to its actual chilling
effect, a recent survey shows that a great majority of public companies have made
policy and procedural adjustments." 8 Most notably, many companies responded that
"they are no longer giving earnings guidance between quarters.""' 9 When companies
clam-up between quarters, and refuse to give guidance to the market, individual
investors are deprived of information that may affect their portfolio's performance.
One corporate officer explained, "[W]e are no longer answering questions about how
the quarter is going or whether or not we are tracking to guidance."4" In the early
stages of Regulation FD's existence, there is evidence of a chilling effect on the
disclosure of information.45 Issuers are cautious when making decisions concerning
the disclosure of information due to the fear of becoming the SEC's poster child for
the enforcement of Regulation FD violations. Consequently, Regulation FD has
chilled the flow of information that reaches Main Street.
The chilling effect eliminates the trickle-down dissemination of information that
was previously filtered through analysts to Main Street investors 52 Wider ranges of
earnings forecasts and greater volatility in stock prices demonstrate the direct impact
of these self-imposed quiet periods.453 Under Regulation FD, corporate officials are
encouraged to remain silent "until they absolutely have to speak."' Subsequently,
447. See Bums, supra note 442.
448. A survey conducted by Thomson Financial/Carson Global Consulting of companies
spread across industries and market capitalization found that 81 percent of issuers have made
policy and procedural changes in response to Regulation FD. Lipschutz, supra note 274.
Another survey shows that 90 percent of companies have made or are planning to make policy
and procedural changes regarding the release of information. Staffand Wire Reports, Investors
Earn, Fair Access: Fair Disclosure Requires Companies to Give Public Same Data As
Investors, CNNFN, Oct. 23, 2000, at
http://money.cnn.com/2000/10/23/markets/disclosure/index.htm.
449. Lipschutz, supra note 274. Regulation FD does not forbid giving earnings guidance
as long as the issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, publicly discloses any material
nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities simultaneously, in the case of an
intentional disclosure, and promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure. 17 C.F.R. §
243.100.
450. Lipschutz, supra note 274. Another corporate officer stated: "We have discontinued
quarterly previews. Each [publicly accessible] quarterly conference call includes earnings
guidance for the next quarter and for the current year, and no earnings guidance is given
between conference calls." Id.
45 1. Id.; see also McGough & Bryan-Low, supra note 336; Scott Bernard Nelson, Share
and Share Alike: The SEC Aims for Fairer Distribution of Information to All Investors,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 2000, at XX; Plitch, supra note 339.
452. See Hill, supra note 275.
453. Id.; see also McGough & Bryan-Low, supra note 336.
454. Unger, supra note 333.
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when they do speak, the disclosure is released to the marketplace as a whole rather
than being filtered down through information channels.455 While Regulation FD
provides for a democratic approach to the dissemination of information,456 it also
provides a high probability of earnings uncertainty, market surprises, and increased
volatility, all of which are contrary to an efficient market.""
Because Regulation FD prohibits issuers from offering private guidance to
analysts-guidance which in turn is filtered throughout the market-the result is
likely to be less accuracy in analysts' reports and more earnings surprises.45 Instead
of slowly leaking information into the market and allowing for a gradual price
adjustment, the broad public dissemination acts as a bombshell on stock prices.459
With all investors responding to earnings forecasts and public releases at the same
time, the markets will suffer from more severe price swings.' Individual investors
will be tempted to buy or sell at inopportune times, thereby executing at increased
trading costs due to excessive volatility.461 The direct harm to Main Street is that
individual investors may get caught in sudden price swings and suffer personal losses
from trading at inappropriate times.
4 62
Specific examples of Regulation FD creating an environment susceptible to
increased price volatility include Intel's recent one-day 22% (September 22, 2000)
decline in share price.463 Other examples of increased volatility and severe price
swings due to Regulation FD's public disclosure requirements include: Home Depot
(29% decline on October 12,2000); Globalstar (60% decline on October 30,2000);
VA Linux (42% decline on November 6, 2000); and Ann Taylor (30% decline on
November 30, 2000).41 When companies issue broad press releases warning of
earnings shortfalls-which have not previously been filtered into the market by
analysts-a barrage of short-term selling is certain to occur."5 Furthermore, rumors
concerning earnings performance announcements could fester and cause volatility to
remain extended.' This negatively affects Main Street because individual investors
can get stuck selling stock (which later rebounds) under value, thereby decreasing
455. Id.
456. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000); Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715,51,716-18 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
'243, and 249).
457. Williams & McGough, supra note 425.
458. Erin E. Arvedlund, Cost of Openness: Reg. FD Could Raise Option Prices,
BARRON'S, Oct. 30, 2000, at 63.
459. Hill, supra note 275.
460. Alex Frew McMillan, RegFD 's Fallout: Access to Company Guidance WillBe Good
in the Long Run. Short-term Unclear, CNNFN, Nov. 14,2000, at
http:llmoney.cnn.com/2000111/14/investing/q_regfda/index.htm.
461. Id.
462. Hill, supra note 275; Lipschutz, supra note 274.
463. Unger, supra note 333.
464. Shilling, supra note 282, at 152 (arguing that analysts failed to predict volatility even
before the enactment of Regulation FD).
465. See Hill, supra note 275.
466. Id.
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investment income.
Expanding upon the example of Cisco's recent failure to meet analysts' earnings
forecasts (examined in Part 1I.B of this Article'), this failure also represents an
example of increased volatility arising from Regulation FD's prohibition against
issuers "walking the Street down."' 2 On February 7, 2001, the day that Cisco
announced fourth quarter earnings a penny short of estimates, the stock fell 13
percent." 9 In addition, "its trading was frenzied: Cisco's share volume topped 279.3
million shares, the second-heaviest day ever for a NASDAQ issue."'47 The record for
the heaviest day ever is held by Intel, with 308.7 million shares traded on September
22, 2000 (the same day as the aforementioned 22% decline in Intel's share price)." 1
This evidence supports the theory that companies, which now divulge information to
a wide public audience in compliance with Regulation FD, spark volatility in trading
activity to the detriment of individual investors. Main Street is at a disadvantage
because large institutional traders are more likely to have the resources to respond
more rapidly and efficiently to the increase in market volatility.47
A subsequent concern is that individual investors are not equipped to interpret
corporate information that has not been processed by Wall Street professionals.7
Now that Main Street has gained the right to equal access of material information,
individual investors are now forced to perform the tasks of professional analysts.7 4
It is possible that this effect of Regulation FD will lead Main Street to react before
the information has been placed in the proper context. Under Regulation FD, issuers
will disseminate material information to the market as a whole, absent the benefit of
analysts ferreting out and processing its relevance.4" An individual investor, for
example, maybelieve that a company raisingprices is apositive sign. However, most
analysts would immediately inquire whether the company was attempting to offset
rising costs.476 Critics of Regulation FD warn that individual investors are likely to
467. See supra text accompanying notes 340-43.
468. Cisco's stellar track record for meeting analysts' expectations can be partially
ascribed to Cisco executives' practice of providing regular earnings guidance to analysts, a
process that has been smothered with the advent of Regulation FD. Until the fourth quarter of
the year 2000, Cisco had met or slightly exceeded analysts' earnings expectations for almost
seven straight years. Unfortunately, when Cisco reported their fourth quarter earnings, they fell
short of the consensus of analysts' estimates. See Zuckerman, supra note 305, at Cl.
469. Id. at Cl, C9 (stating that Cisco's fourth quarter earnings "came in at 12 cents a
diluted share, a penny short of estimates").
470. Id. at Cl.
471. I'd.; see also Shilling, supra note 282, at 152.
472. McMillan, supra note 460.
473. See Staff and Wire Reports, supra note 448; Unger, supra note 333.
474. Unger, supra note 333 ("Discussing the role of analysts, the Supreme Court noted
in Dirks that '[i]t is the nature of [analysts' judgments about companies and their securities],
and indeed of the markets themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously
available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the public generally.' Yet Regulation FD
seeks to accomplish exactly that result.").
475. Id.
476. See Hill, supra note 275.
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get tangled in volatile price swings and execute trades at inappropriate times or on
misunderstood information.4"
Many have commented that individual investors no longer need analysts and
market professionals to interpret corporate information.478 Alternatively, many others
hold that analysts play an important role by digesting and placing in context corporate
information, and acting as conduits in the flow of information to the individual
investor.479 Considering individual investors' recent returns in the prosperous bull
market, it seems as though Main Street is making wise investment decisions."8
Since 1991, for example, the average individual investor's annual return has ranged
from 11.4 % to 17.9 %.4" This performance record justifies the conclusion that
individual investors no longer need interpreters to act as gatekeepers of corporate
information." 3 However, an alternative interpretation may attribute individual
investors' success to the overall bull market run of the 1990s, rather than to their own
skill and astuteness in interpreting corporate information.48 Obviously, during the
most prosperous growth phase in market history, individual investors were capable
of making profitable investment decisions. 4 ' However, working within the
Regulation FD environment, are individual investors capable of making efficient
decisions in a downturn, bear market"6 economy, absent professional analysts to
ferret out, analyze, and report relevant information?
It seems likely that Main Street's ability to decipher corporate data would suffer
in deteriorating market conditions-especially in a bear market-without the
analytical assistance of Wall Street professionals. The simple and powerful
explanation for the belief that individual investors no longer need market
professionals to interpret corporate information is overconfidence.487 Main Street
investors are overconfident about their abilities, their knowledge, and their future
prospects for investment returns. Individual investors seem to attribute their successes
to their own abilities, even when such self-attribution is not fully warranted.4 8 Recent
477. See McMillan, supra note 460.
478. See Smith, supra note 328.
479. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983); see also In re Investors Mgmt. Co.,
44 S.E.C. 633,646 (1971); The Regulation of Securities Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174 (Dec.
4, 1998); Unger, supra note 333.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 352-66.
481. See Siegel, supra note 374; Gutierrez & Moszkowski, supra note 373, at 5-9.
482. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 53 J. FIN. 773,775 (2000).
483. See Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715,51,716-17 (Aug.
24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249); see also Levitt, supra note 1.
484. See Siegel, supra note 374.
485. See supra text accompanying notes 372-90.
486. Bear market is defined as a "prolonged period of falling prices. A bear market in
stocks is usually brought on by the anticipation of declining economic activity, and a bear
market in bonds is caused by rising interest rates." BARRON's DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 50 (5th ed. 1998).
487. See Barber & Odean, supra note 482, at 790-94.
488. See id. (presenting the models of investor overconfidence, including self-attribution
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investment success resulting from prosperous market conditions has fostered
overconfidence in individual investors' abilities to analyze information 89
In application, Regulation FD works to undermine previous methods by which
corporate information progressed through the market (from companies to analysts to
investors). 9' Individual investors are now forced to perform the interpretive role
previously assumed by professional analysts because Regulation FD diminishes the
fundamental functions of financial analysts that the Supreme Court recognized in
Dirks as "necessary to the preservation of a healthy market."49 By adopting
Regulation FD, the SEC has leveled the playing field in the battle for corporate
information, but in doing so, it has negatively affected individual investors by chilling
the flow of information, increasing volatility, and jeopardizing the ECMH (by way
of disturbing the available'n information in the market).
V. PUBLIC COMPANIES' COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATION FD
With the adoption of Regulation FD, issuers must respond by adjusting disclosure
policies to fit within the confines of the new SEC rule. Regulation FD encourages
public companies to review, revise, and implement updated policies concerning the
release of material information.49 Although Regulation FD does not require issuers
to adopt formal written policies and procedures to comply with the new rule, such
action is well advised. 9 As the SEC states in the adopting release, "[T]he existence
of [a disclosure policy], and the issuer's general adherence to it, may oftenbe relevant
to determining the issuer's intent with regard to a selective disclosure."495 Therefore,
a written policy will be pertinent to deciding whether an issuer is reckless in making
a selective disclosure of material information and, thus, subject to liability under
Regulation FD.'
Conversely, failure to adopt a written policy is likely to be considered a negative
factor when determining an issuer's liabilityunderRegulation FD.497 When enforcing
bias).
489. Id.
490. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715,51,716-19 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,243, and 249); see also Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 243.100-.103 (2001); Williams & McGough, supra note 425.
491. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,658 (1983).
492. The ECMH functions on the theory that security prices in primary markets reflect all
available information about a given security with such speed that even sophisticated investors
cannot profit from trading on newly available information. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554, 571-72 (1984).
493. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721, 51,726 n.90.
494. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 n.90.
495. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 n.90.
496. See id.
497. A written policy is relevant in demonstrating to the SEC an overall corporate
awareness of the general principle that selective disclosure is prohibited and, moreover, is
likely to increase corporate credibility through an effective implementation and enforcement
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Regulation FD, it is clear that the SEC, in assessing an issuer's intent with regard to
a selective disclosure, will consider whether an issuer has an appropriate policy in
place and if they generally adhere to it."" To comply with Regulation FD, public
companies should implement written policies and procedures with regards to the
disclosure of material nonpublic information. This Part addresses the practices that,
at a minimum, public companies should consider when developing and implementing
a written policy.
A. Expand Disclosure in Periodic Reports
As a general practice, issuers should expand the scope of disclosure in annual and
quarterly reports to include the topics that they expect to cover in communications
with investors and analysts.4 The suggested place for such expanded, forward-
looking disclosure is in the Management's Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A")'
section ofperiodic reports.- Specifically, the disclosure should appearin the MD&A
subsection titled "Liquidity"' or an introductory overview section called
"Outlook," °3 "Future Operations," ' or a similar title.5 5 By expanding the scope of
disclosure in SEC reports, issuers will be less constrained in their private
communications because much of what they wish to discuss will already be public
information.'
A corollary issue is Regulation FD's application to communications atroadshows.
Whether Regulation FD applies depends on the nature of the issuer." 7 Regulation FD
of the policy. See id. at 51,721, 51,726 n.90. Also, a written policy provides more substantive
and credible evidence than would nonwritten policies and procedures.
498. Id. at 51,726 n.90.
499. Id. at 51,726. See generally supra text accompanying notes 176-92.
500. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2001) (information required by Item 303 of
Regulation S-K).
501. E.g., Form 10-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,104 (Jan. 9,2002); Form 10-Q. 5
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,033 (Feb. 24, 1999).
502. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (Regulation S-K, Item 303).
503. See id. § 229.101 (Item 101, Description of Business).
504. See id.
505. See, e.g., id. § 229.303(a) Instruction 7 (quantitative and qualitative disclosures about
market risk).
506. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2000). As discussed in Part II.D.2. of this
Article, the SEC affirms in the adopting release the "mosaic" theory, which should allow
issuers to provide greater detail to analysts and investors on areas of interest to them as long
as the big picture has previously been disclosed to the public. Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,722 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,
243, and 249). For example, if the issuer's MD&A section of the issuer's Form I 0-Q discloses
the allocation of $400 million in budgeted capital expenditures for the next two years, it may
be permissible in the absence of special circumstances to disclose to an analyst in a one-on-one
that the budget is roughly $50 million per quarter over the same period.
507. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.101.
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generally does not apply if the roadshow is for a registered primary offering."0
Alternatively, if the roadshow is for a secondary offering or an unregistered offering,
Regulation FD would apply unless the issuer is not a reporting company under the
Exchange Act, a foreign private issuer, or a foreign government' Therefore, issuers
that hold roadshow meetings to sell securities in private placements (such as high-
yield bond financing and Rule 144A transactions1 0) may be restricted in what they
discuss unless previous public disclosures already cover, or can be amended before
the start of or during the roadshow to cover, the topics that investors and analysts will
want to discuss.5 ' To avoid selective disclosures in the context of private placements,
public companies should expand the scope of public disclosures in periodic reports
so that they are consistent with roadshow and private presentations."1
B. Authorize and Educate Issuer Representatives
Because Regulation FD covers disclosures made by senior officials, or any other
officers, employees, or agents who regularly communicate with Wall Street, issuers
should formally designate and limit the individuals who are permitted to communicate
regularly with securities market professionals or shareholders."1 Considering the
increased responsibility that Regulation FD places on such representatives, issuers
should consider who these authorized spokespersons should be and limit their
number.1 4 Once the disclosure team is selected, the members should be educated
about the types of communications that are permitted under Regulation FD. Also,
authorized spokespersons should be kept well informed about all corporate
508. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725. The regulation of
roadshows in connection with registered primary offerings remains essentially where it was
prior to the adoption of Regulation FD. It should be noted, however, that the SEC staff has
forced some issuers, because of potential Section 5 concerns, to place in the prospectus
information that has leaked from roadshows into the press. See id. at 51,726.
509. See 17 C.F.R § 243.101(b).
510. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2001) (covering private resales of securities to qualified
institutional buyers).
511.See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100.
512. Seeid. §§ 243.100-.103.
513. See id. § 243.101(c).
514. See id.; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715,
51,720 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249). The issuer's
written disclosure policy should define a disclosure team, members ofwhich will: (1) serve as
a liaison for inquiries about Regulation FD and materiality issues; (2) be present during
contacts with analysts and investors; (3) maintain a record of information covered; and (4)
determine whether material nonpublic information is inadvertently disclosed. The disclosure
team should include in-house counsel, the CFO, investor relations representatives, public
relations representatives, and any other person designated as a primary interface with Wall
Street or the investor community. The issuer's Regulation FD disclosure policy should further
provide that only authorized spokespersons may engage in discussions with securities market
professionals, shareholders, and investors. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65
Fed. Reg. at 51,720-21, 51,721 n.44.
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developments, thereby enabling them to anticipate and respond to inquiries. All
nonauthorized employees should be instructed to direct inquiries from market
professionals and securities holders to a designated spokesperson.
Company spokespersons will be responsible for making quick determinations
about whether a potential disclosure involves material nonpublic information.5t5 In
making that decision, the authorized representative must know what information the
issuer has previously disclosed and what analysts and the media have said about the
company and its competitors. Thus, it is important that spokespersons stay abreast of
what corporate information is public in order to adequately make on-the-spot
materiality assessments.5 16 It is suggested that all authorized spokespersons be
periodically briefed on corporate developments and the subsequent requirements
under Regulation FD concerning that information. Specifically, the company
representatives should be instructed as to the status of the corporate information with
respect to Regulation FD's "materiality""17 and "nonpublic" ' s8 standards. Issuers
should highlight those topics that will always be considered off limits for nonpublic
discussion, such as rumors of possible business combinations and guidance on
earnings estimates. 1 9
Issuers should also consider, in given situations, requiring more than one
authorized representative to participate in conversations with analysts and
institutional investors. This precautionary measure can help develop a protective
record by having a third party present for all corporate disclosures. Having a variety
of company spokespersons present will facilitate swift determinations concerning
materiality and, if necessary, will provide support in defending such judgments.
C. Monitor for Non-Intentional Disclosure
When implementing policies and procedures, issuers should consider strategies to
determine whether and when material nonpublic information has been disclosed. 2
Regulation FD requires issuers to respond promptly to non-intentional disclosures of
material nonpublic information 52-in most cases, within twenty-four hours after the
issuer learns that material nonpublic information has been selectively disclosed."2
The company's new policies and procedures should cover how and when a necessary
515. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720-21.
516. See id.
517. See supra Part II.D.
518. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
519. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721; see also
Walker, supra note 101; supra text accompanying note 101.
520. Ideally, public companies will implement aprocedure to be followed in the event that
a covered person mistakenly makes a non-intentional disclosure of material nonpublic
information. This practice is likely to facilitate a more efficient, prompt public disclosure of
the information mistakenly disclosed. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100, .101(c)-
.101(e) (2000).
521. Id. § 243.100(a)(2).
522. Id. §§ 243.100(a)(2),.101(d); see also Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 65
Fed. Reg. at 51,722-23.
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public disclosure should be made, and when coordination with investor
relations/public relations personnel and outside counsel is required."
Public companies should also consider monitoring their stock price after one-on-
ones or analyst conference calls. Movement in the stock price immediately following
private communications with market professionals in which the issuer spokesperson
disclosed information determined to be immaterial could be a telling indication that
the spokesperson may have been wrong, thereby requiring prompt public
disclosure. 24
In determining whether prompt public disclosure is required under Regulation FD,
advice from issuer's counsel is appropriate, especially if the issuer chooses to file
information on Form 8-K.1 Depending on the circumstances, the issuer may wish
to avoid public disclosure by attempting to obtain an after-the-fact confidentiality
agreement from the recipient of the mistakenly disclosed information. 6 Accordingly,
the first step an issuer should consider is to ask the recipient of the disclosure to
expressly agree-ideally in a written agreement527--not to disclose or trade on the
basis of the information." Ifa confidentiality agreement is subsequently negotiated,
the issuer will have no obligation to promptly disclose the information.' 9 If no
satisfactory confidentiality agreement can be reached, the issuer will have an
obligationto makeprompt public disclosure of the mistakenlyreleased information. 3
The full spectrum of options available to issuers will be foreclosed if procedures
are not in place to quickly respond to a non-intentional selective disclosure. The
appropriate corporate officials and legalrepresentation must be expeditiously alerted
of an event triggering a possible Regulation FD public disclosure. Therefore, it is
advisable that public companies implement an internal procedure to mqnitor and
respond to situations where an authorized representative mistakenly makes a non-
intentional disclosure of material nonpublic information.
D. Evaluate the Means of Public Disclosure
When making a public disclosure, issuers must be sensitive to what constitutes a
523. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a)(2), .101(d); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722-23.
524. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a)(2), .101(d); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 5 1,722-23.
525. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723. Form 8-K is
used to report material happenings. Form 8-K, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,001-04 (2001).
Seesupra text accompanying notes 161-71 (addressing the considerations involved in deciding
whether to "file" or "furnish" information on Form 8-K).
526. Rule I 00(b)(2)(ii) of Regulation FD excludes from coverage communications made
"ftlo a person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence." 17
C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii).
527. See supra note 242.
528. See supra note 242; see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 51,720 n.28.
529. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a)(2), .100(b)(2)(ii).
530. See id. §§ 243.100(a)(2), .100(b)(2)(ii).
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"broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.' 'n Issuers
must select a method of public disclosure that is designed to provide a broad
dissemination ofthe information. 32 Press releases, press conferences, and conference
calls are viable solutions to the public disclosure requirements of Regulation D. 33
Increasingly, press conferences and conference calls are becoming accessible to the
public either in person, through the Interet, or over the telephone.534 Notably,
because Regulation FD does not require that public participants be entitled to ask
questions or participate, the press conferences or conference calls can be conducted
on a listen-only basis for members of the general public.535 Although Regulation FD
does not require the use of any particular method of disclosure,536 the language
suggests that a single method of disclosure may or may not be sufficient to provide
broad public disclosure.537 Therefore, it is advised that issuers intending to make
public disclosures via press conferences or conference calls give adequate notice of
such events either by press release, posting of notice on the issuer's Web site, or by
furnishing the information on a Form 8-K 3 The notice must inform the public as to
the time and place of the event and the means for accessing the conference or call.539
An alternative means of dissemination is posting the information itself on the
issuer's Web site, which, standing alone, is not likely to constitute adequate public
disclosures.' Therefore, it is recommended that posting information on an issuer's
Web site be used in combination with other methods of public disclosure."' Issuers
who use their Web sites as the sole means of making a public disclosure assume the
risk and burden of establishing that the method was reasonably designed to provide
broad, nonexclusionary dissemination of the information. 2 Issuers who utilize press
releases to disclose information must examine whether or not their press releases are
carried by major wire services. 3 If not, a press release, by itself, is not likely to be
considered adequate public disclosure under Regulation FD." Smaller issuers should
take note: where an issuer knows that its press releases are not routinely disseminated
531. Id. § 243.101(e)(2).
532. Id.
533. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724.
534. See Scherreik, supra note 332, at 118.
535. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724 n.71.
536. Id. at 51,724.
537. See id.
538. See id.; see also supra note 525.
539. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. See id. The SEC has stated that "[a]s technology evolves and as more investors have
access to and use the Internet ... we believe that some issuers, whose [Web sites] are widely
followed by the investment community, could use such a method." Id. From the tone that the
SEC takes in this statement referring to Web site disclosure as a sole method of public
disclosure, it seems that currently Web site disclosure, by itself, is a frowned upon method of
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by business wire services, it is not sufficient to make public disclosure simply by
releasing information to such wire services."
Although Regulation FD provides issuers the opportunity to adequately disclose
information on Form 8-K, issuers should be cautious in doing so, given that Form 8-K
filings present other liability issues.' There is no one-size-fits-all standard for
making a public disclosure; rather, issuers must select a method of disclosure based
on the particular circumstances of their situation.' 7 When making a planned public
disclosure, issuers should use a combination of methods designed to effect broad
public dissemination of the information. First, the company should issue a press
release through news wire service containing the information." Second, if the issuer
intends to hold a conference call to discuss the disclosed information, it should
"provide adequate notice, by a press release and/or website posting," of when the call
will be held and how it can be accessed." 9 Finally, the issuer should permit members
of the public to listen in on the conference call either by telephone or Intemet."S In
following this procedure, issuers are able to discuss the released information on
conference calls without the fear that they will be engaged in improper selective
disclosure in violation of Regulation FD."
E. Develop a Procedure for Communicating with Analysts
Operating within the confines of the new Regulation FD environment, issuers must
evaluate and decide how to deal with analysts. 52 Corporate officials should anticipate
the scope of communications that are likely to occur during private sessions with
analysts, with other market professionals, or at investor conferences."5 3 Expounding
on topics and issues that are already covered in public disclosures will generally be
acceptable because such details will not involve material nonpublic information."
Also, providing information at a broad and general level to market professionals and
investors is permissible if proper disclosure has previously been made at an
appropriate level of materiality and generality."5 However, allowing disclosure to
venture into topics not covered at the general level in public releases can raise
concerns under Regulation FD.'
With the threat of becoming the SEC's poster child for the enforcement of
545. See id. For some issuers, Form 8-K may very well be the only "sure" way of
complying with the Regulation FD public disclosure requirement. See id. at 51,723-24.
546. See id. at 51,723; see also supra text accompanying notes 161-76.





552. Id. at 51,722.
553. See id.
554. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2000).
555. See supra note 506.
556. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100(a), .101(e)(2); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
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Regulation FD, issuers must consider whether to continue granting one-on-one
meetings and telephone calls with analysts and other market professionals. Some legal
counsel may recommend the discontinuance of one-on-ones until the uncertainty
surrounding Regulation FD has cleared. However, provided that a company
implements appropriate policies and procedures for the public disclosure of
information within the constraints of Regulation FD, this is not necessary.5" The
importance for public companies to relay information to Wall Street professionals as
well as Main Street investors is well recognized, and issuers should not place
themselves at a competitive disadvantage by cutting off one-on-one communications
with financial analysts. Regulation FD provides sufficient safeguards that enable
well-groomed corporate officers and trained spokespersons to continue meeting with
analysts without excessive concern of violating Regulation FD and becoming subject
to SEC sanctions.55"
In choosing to continue holding one-on-ones with analysts and market
professionals, issuers must take special care to avoid nonpublic discussions of
earnings." Specifically, one-on-ones and private communications with analysts for
the purpose of giving earnings guidance are not advisable.' When earnings are
projected to come in below-or above-expectations, a broadly disseminated
earnings warning press release is the suggested disclosure approach in light of
Regulation FD.ssl If it is the issuer's corporate practice to provide earnings guidance
to analysts concerning future results, and the issuer intends to continue such practice,
the issuer must simultaneously provide the earnings guidance to the public. 2
It is suggested that issuers, who regularly participate in unscripted private
communications with analysts, develop a list of "off-limits" topics of discussion that
pose substantial risks under Regulation FD. 3 For scheduled private conversations
and one-on-ones, the issuer's representatives and spokespersons should determine in
advance the topics that the analyst wants to cover and limit discussion to such
matters.' Moreover, authorized spokespersons should decline to answer questions
557. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,726 n.90; see also
generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103.
558. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722. Such
safeguards include the requirement that an impermissible disclosure be knowingor reckless and
the issuer's ability to rectify a non-intentional selective disclosure bypromptly making a public
disclosure of the information. See id. at 51,722-23.
559. Id. at 51,721; see also Walker, supra note 111.
560. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721; see also
Telephone Interpretations, supra note 71, at Question I. This manual may be viewed at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone.shtml.
561. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
562. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(1) (stating that issuers must make simultaneous public
disclosure of any material nonpublic information that is intentionally released).
563. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721 n.44.
564. Id. at 51,722. Prior to a scheduled interaction with a Wall Street professional or
inventor representative, the issuer's authorized spokesperson should take an inventory of any
company information that may be deemed material nonpublic information. Following such
internal examination the spokesperson should decide and red flag, prior to the scheduled
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that are outside the purview of planned discussions and that raise potentially material
issues.56 Finally, following private discussions and one-on-ones, authorized
representatives should review any statements made and assess whether any material
nonpublic information was inadvertently released, thereby triggering prompt public
disclosure under Regulation FD.1
CONCLUSION
Now that the SEC's new Regulation FD is in effect, every Wall Street
professional, Main Street investor, journalist, lawyer, and policy theorist has a
distinct opinion about its impact on market conditions. Every constituency has a
differing viewpoint, ranging from Wall Street's complaints of increased volatility,
decreased liquidity, and diminishing visibility of corporate earnings to Main Street's
praise of finally being on par with analysts at Merrill Lynch or fund managers at
Fidelity. This Article provides an analysis of the elements of Regulation FD as well
as a summary of the potential impact that the SEC's new rules will have on market
participants. And, as a final point, this Article asserts that Regulation FD's impact is
overstated. The implementation of Regulation FD has come and gone and securities
markets have survived.
Regulation FD is unlikely to completely chill the disclosure of information by
public companies; rather, it will merely shape communications between companies
and investment professionals. However, corporate counsel has instilled the fear of
God in issuers, and the understandable goal for companies during the introductory
phase of Regulation FD is to avoid becoming the SEC's enforcement test case. Until
the SEC pins up a poster child, caution will reign. Yet, as ambiguities surrounding
Regulation FD are clarified and issuers gain experience operating in the new
environment, the collateral impact on Wall Street and Main Street will gradually
decline.
Just as the market adapted to Section 11 of the Securities Act and numerous other
rules promulgated by the SEC, market participants must adjust their practices to
operate within the Regulation FD regime. Analysts must rely less on corporate
earnings guidance and do more diligent legwork. Individual investors, now on a level
playing field, must be proficient in analyzing the simultaneous release of corporate
information. Until market participants adjust to the new environment, there remains
a veryreal down side-more earnings surprises due to inaccurate analyst reports and
greater volatility due to investors' inaccurate interpretation and implementation of
corporate information. Only time will tell how long it will take capital markets to
adjust to the implementation of Regulation FD. However, this Article presents the
theory that the uproar will pass sooner rather than later, and that Wall Street
professionals will contrive new ways to get better information than the information
available to Main Street investors. Simply stated, Wall Street will always have an
interaction, information that is off limits for discussion. During the scheduled interaction,
should a red flag topic arise in a question presented by the market professional, the authorized
spokesperson shall decline to answer such a question. See id. at 51,722, 51,722 n.44.
565. See id. at 51,721; see also Walker, supra note 111.
566. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100, .101.
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edge over Main Street.
